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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is concerned with the problem of entailment. 
Entailment is a form of implication, perhaps the strongest found 
in logical calculi. The development of entailment logics is 
rather new in the history of logic. The entailment concept has 
however, been employed for the designation of a strong implica-
tion relation between antecedent and consequent. It has been 
used by some to designate deducibility. There are, however, 
altern:-itive systems of implication which have been fanned and 
l'quatl'd by s,,mc to the concept of entnilment. A centrnl 
question then, is whnt conditions shall be given to an 
acceptable statement of entailment, and how does entailment differ 
from alternative implication systems? 
The properties which are inherent in logical implication are 
shown by a historical sketch in this thesis. The first form of 
implication discussed is 'material implication.' Material im-
plication as found in Russell and Whitehead's Principia 
Mathematica is discussed. Following upon this the evolution of 
strict implication and the 'S' systems of C.I. Lewis and E.H. 
Langford are analyzed. In the context of these discussions both 
the common and diverse properties are discussed. It is found 
that both material and strict implication have internal weak-
ness in so far as both produce implicational paradoxes. 
i 
Tl1l' q111•~:t i ,, 11 t ltv11 h,·1·1>111!',~. c:111 ;111 1•111 ;1 i l 111,·11I I 1'!'. i 1· ,1v1'1·c·llm,• t li,·s,• 
c!o:-:c·s p('C:lll L1r t1 1 t lie system::; ci.tcd? 
is cksi;;n:11.cd 'I ·:' for e11t.7iln1c•nt by tltC' ;111tltnrs. The system E 
is formed by combining the scmant ic:11 clwr,1ctcr of "relevance" 
with that l'C ncccssit:-,,. Tt is slinwn tlt.7t the system E d,ws 1wt 
co11t0in the p0r0do:dC',1l theorems nnr :rnv :rn:1lPf.tt1'S ,1[ the tl1L'111·1·ms 
In the contl'Xt u[ this <liscussinn a 
pro?er focus is given for several logic0l terms 11sed in describing 
the re];itions between antecedent and consequent. 
Th<.! rvs(';irch of tli-is thesis de;ils wi tlt ccrt.7in definite 
problems. Is strict i.mpl.i.c;ition the s:1mc ns cnt.1ilmcnt? i\ccordi.ng 
to the resc[lrch of this thesis this identification is doubtful. Of 
furt he r concern is \.Jlictlicr or rather wh:1t ]ngicnlly follows from 
c on t r a cJ i c t i n n . Tit is res ea r c h r c j e c ts t he c 1 a i ms t 1 w t any t h in g 
whatsoever "follm.Js from" 11 conrrn<liction. A finnl concern of this 
rescarC'h is the n'l:1t ion of cnta-L]rncnt in mod:1] scm:intics. This 
as mod:1l mn,k•]s 1in tlt1' one hand ,7nd thc nnture of possihil ity on the 
other. It is found that .-in impossilil1' prnp,,siti,,n need 1wt h.1VL' the 
essential form of ;1 cont:r;i<liction. 
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TNTHnJ)l'CTI n·J 
The r11rrosC' n f this tlH•sis is t<' :1r1.11v?.r rhr lnr:i.r.,11 n:-J.1tion 
,if '·cnt,1ilmrnt'. 
of cntai.J,..,rnt ns n form of iMplicntinn. T11r rrohlcm r:cntPrs on 
on f,1ce V.'.1]11r, is nnt ,1t ,111 c1e.ir-cnt. For ,1s Is rnm~nnlv knn~n, 
fln thr ntlirr h,1ncl, there is 
thr l"lnr<' sophistfr:itrd svstcm of 'stricr irnr1 ir..ition ', ,,,.fdrh is 
clevr]opcri rmploving mod;ility. Thrrr> nr c furthermore othrr systems 
est.1hlishin ,I', the relntJnn in rp1rst:inn. Thr r.iin c-nmponrnts 
c mplovpd df' ~ ll't1::t<· :1ccordln r. l•: tl 11' :llltrrl<•dt•nt, thl~ 1or,ir:i1 svr,hnl 
for impli c .1t[o11 :111,.I thr c.nnsecJlicnt. 
'for,..,' <1s p :::> q, ccrt,1in clcsr .riptinns brrnrnr ,1rrDrf'nt. The 
p. nets ,1 .,; the prc•miscs, \,11lilr '1 .'.lC ts ,1S 
the c.onc-l11'.do11 nf ,1:1 .1r,.t1mL'nt. 
t:il:1 t fl 
the ,1sscrtinn nf q • J\ut hm.T sh.111 '··-'C rc.,d s11ch ,1 forTT1ul..1? 
Th,, 11 ,1 t' I 1 r;, 1 
,. 
p , .• 1'11t •.:h.it 
'.;[!'.tii fic,1nc-r i~~ t lt0rc• to ,<'rt.1 ln ntht>r ~.t:1t:c•1!1Cnt~ ,1s '' q fo110w1, 
p i~; ,1crivnhlf' frn11 T' ,1 '.1 c! S t il l_ f ll r t Ji (' r , 
I' 
" r cnt.1ils n "? 
Tn the s vstCT:'! 
,1S 
.:iddre:-s t· lic 1inrlerlvin!' [~;s11f's ir.irl irit in tl1r !'Iii ln,.ophir:1] 
CO ll r <' f1 t i O 11 P f f rn ;') ) i C ;1 t i n n , T n t Ji(' ~; V '.; t C' Pl n r "l'I ,1 ll: r i.1 ] J r.: p ] i C .1 t 1 0 n 1 ' 
1 1 
::, ' ' i ~; (1c f j npr{ (1~: 
n .::> <7 = dF."-'p v q 
Ti:<· ,•::tin fnrm nr tld,. 
r.otnriou'., hci.n 1,, f';:) (q ::> p) 
if p (is true') then q impli0s n Jl 
"f o 1101 -.•s from'' '7 in ,1nv :>r<".0rt.1h 1 <' sf'ns<'? 
c r i t i c i s fl1 i s th .1 t t l 1 <' rr• i s .1 f ., J 1.7 c v n f r '.' l c v ,1 n c C' , t h ,1 t i s r: o s ,1 \' , 
th~r<' j,. no nhvio11:; ,-onnrct1.nn h0t1 -!rC'n th<' nntrcf'dPnt ,rn~l the 
The r:n1·c, rnr·pl ir:1t1'd svstr•11 nr !;vstf'r:is pf ''stri .ct irirl ic-.,ti0n" 
"stri<".t "ir:ipl i<".:rt·inn" cmrlov!; t:hr .•;vmhnl 
th<' fir.Ii-hook. Tn t!ii!; r;v,-t0r>1, f1 -:3 rJ 
i~p1ics '1 
, c.,llcd hv s0~r• 




J s : 
p "") ri = l)f. ~~1 (p. ~ri) 
Thr nhnvr drFiniti.nn stntes t~nt For r tn strirtlv i~nlv CJ, 
i t i s n n t r n s " i h 1 ,~ r o r r tr• 1, r · t n I r :i n c 1 ri f .1 1 •: r . Thr df"finitinn 
sn r-,ivrn .1lln1,:. tl :r rl1•sir .1blc· fr .1t11rr, th:1t t'H'n' is ;i nr .. rss;irv 
ronnrrtion h1•t•irPn ,1ntrr:c-clrnt ;ind cnnserp1rnt:. 
c,,nstructrd ,10es 11()•,•rvcr h.1vc its rrnl•lc~.1ti.c1l t!irnrcr-,s, ,c;11ch ,1,c;: 
q ~ (p v"'-'p). 
Thr ,1hovc .s,1vs tl1.1t :1 nrres .s.1:-v rrnrn~;itinn i,- cntnilrd hv 
,1n•r rrorostjnn. 1l11t dnrs ,1 nc .. rss.,rv rirnr0sitj0n ''foJ low frnr,," 
;in,,. prf'pn:.!t:inn? 
Tn thC' tc:-:t nf •.:h .1t fnlln•-:s, t 11c svc;t(•f"'l nf ".strict lrrp]ic.1tinn" 
Tlir• distinctlvr:-nr!,s nf 
throrc 111s of fl'ntcri.,l i!'l:pli.cntinn .,re nnprnv.1hl!' .,s throrC'r.is of 
"'.;trict ifllplic,1tinn". Fnl lo1Jinr, 11nnn r.his. the "r,1r,1ro~:es 1 • of 
"st r j ct i m r 1 i c ;it inn " ,,:i 1 l h C'. discus,, rd . Tn th<' ,1ttcnrt to cl irnin.,tc 
Tr 1-•ill hl' fpun,l tl1.1t sv~,rf'"lt ''J-:'' i~ive1, :tn inruit!vrlv :1r.rf'rtnh!r) 
T,'c ,-li :111 find 
i 1:1 J' l J c ., t i n n " • 
Tn l•.'h,1t fnl ]n, .,..;, sr.1.111 lrtt:rr c; sl1.1! 1 n,rrr tn nropnsition.11 




The pioneer work in the development of systems of strict 
implication was done by C.I. Lewis. Further advancements and 
progress were made by the collaboration of C.I. Lewis with 
C.H. Langford in the co-authored book entitled Symbolic 
~ogic. Strict implication is a species of "modal logic", but 
more precisely, of modern modal logic, inasmuch as the notion 
of modality, in principle, is nothing new. In the history of 
philosophy, such thinkers as early as Aristotle had recourse to 
modal notions,1 even Kant went so far as to make modality a 
category. 2 
Modern logistics, however, had with the development of 
Principia Mathematica, 3 access to more rigorous and in effect 
more precise machinery for analysis, the principal benefits 
being the advancement of axiomatic techniques in logic. 
In the context o[ Principia Mathematica 4 or more 





Aristotle, Prior Analytics, passim. 
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp 
Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1929), p. 239. 
Alfred North Whitehead, Bertrand Russell, Principia Mathema-
tica to #56 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1970), preface V. 
Ibid., p. xvi. 
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1,hf c h !;tir1111.7trd ::11,-h ,7ttthnrs .1s r.T. l.r'.ii s ,711,! r..Jl. T..7n?,fnrd to 
e x;ilorc the n .7turr nf i~p1i,,7tion. ln !'.''., r·hr <lrfinition of 
fr1pli,:1tion 1~. 1•, fv<·n In t:0n1;; nf 11r·;•:1t i"n .1n1~ di~; i 11n,·tir- n . th ,7t ir, 
,7t *1.0 1 in r' " ... 1.-: r f i nc! : 
n. = . ~ p V 11 i"f. 
T.ikc1 ,•i:.P, w0 find tltr> st,7tcf'l011t s ; ( ;1 r; C' Y. ~• 1 ,'! n ., r ion) . ' · T n 
i_s f,-il Sl' or <1 i .c-: tn1 c : h c• n, <, • f r 
tr u e. T ll!ls, th0 :ihovc dcf.ini.tion nrc>sr.n•rs thr 0sc;0nti.7l ch,7r,1c-
t0r i stic of ir 1r1 ir..7tion: it rivrs, (n f.1ct, tl1r niost 00nor;il 
r10,711Jn~ r.nmp,7tiblo ,.·!th thr 11rcsrrv,7t{<1n nf tlli :~ ch,7r ,1C'.terlstic." 1 
1-.10 slir,11lrl note In p.1c;:; Jnr tl1.1t I'.'! .. 1l !:n i11r.orpnr .1t<•d t11r. idC',1 of 
This nc, ~d not c.1t1"r ;,nv hm,:,,li.1t<' rli~fjc11lt:f0 .r, 
fr-r the r1·is,t1s:.io11 1-:!dr.h follows, for th<' :dr,plr r0.1 s on th,1t M.1nv 
f l • • 1 • 1 . ] (i o t .w rrof)crt1,:,s ot t 11r, re ,1tJon .1n• :in., 0,7011s. 
:111,l l .:111<>_fn1·,I '1:1v1• <',71 lt•cl " :; tTlrt · ir~nl fr:11 Inn". 1'11,• rn.7ill _rn.11, 11f 
) . . 
11,id., p. n/,, 
-~0-~-. C:h.1p:;. CJ ,c, 1 n. t. 1.h.1n. Tr T nf T'r. i 11(" i Tl i ;1 '':i thrn,1_t i ("_,7' 
hv T>•rtr, ,11,! :)11s:;c•l 1 , f nr f11rt l1,,r r1iscw ; :dn ns. 
7 
d L" t 1 n 1. u i. sh i n f. th c. t 1-:0 s vs t <:'Ms n f -j l"' p 1 i r ;i t in ri • 
1) "Strirt .impl lr.1tinn'' is r1<:'id1•11rrl tn r<'Pr<:''.;r'nt synJ,n] Jr,111v 
tl1(' r<:'l.1ti011 ''ri is derl11rfl,lr frnm p". 
2 ) "~ r ;-i tr. r Li l in p l i c ;i ti on " is <:',; ~; r:, t i ,1 1 1 y :1 r <:' l.1 t i on h c t 1-· r. r n 
t•-:o prnpositions clC't<:'n~ir.rcl bv <:'Xt<:'nslnnnl. fc;itlln~.s. 
3) "Strict i~rlir,1tinn" is fnrr1,1llv c1f,.tinf.lli~;hrd from 
''nt.1LC"ri'.1! inq,l ic;itinn" hv t.ht' fnll,11-·in." p,ir;tul.1t<:': 
( 3 !' , ri ) : ;-v ( n -) ri ) • rv ( r -3 "-' 'I ) 
Thl' first ohscrv,1tion is r<:'.1r!i lv :.<>rn tn he ,1 rc.nckri.nr of 
w Ii .1 t L cw i s .1 n c1 L.1 n P-f o r cl pf' r c riv c to 1) C' th c f's .c; <:' n t i ,1 l f <:' ,1 tu r c o f 
strict implic;itinn. TliC' ide.1 of d<:'r111rild1Hv, .1:. t!1<:' ftlll(1.1rn<:'nt,.,l 
th.1t: a nrnp<:'r fnr!'\.1t for ;in [:11111 ic;itiv<:' r.1lcul11s ,;11<1111cl c,1rt:11rc a 
s t r n n r- 1 n ~ i c:1 l r c 1 .1 r. i on b c• t: •.,• c C' 11 ,111 L <:' c <:'cl<:' 11t ,111 rl r on st' q u c n t • T n 
1-:h,1t folln•.,:;;, h'C' sl1.1ll ol,sC'rVC' the c!rvC'lop,wnt of strict i111pl.ic;i-
tinn, form ,1 fnr::1.11 point of view, 1-:it:h tlH• ,1irl of rioclnl nntions. 
In contrnst, howr.v<:'t·, the sC'rnnrl o11 serv.1tion L1vs c111ph,1si.s on 
(' X t C' n S i < l Tl ,7 1 f <' ,7 t 11 rl' S , th,1t ir;, tr11tli v:1l11C'. 
tn note th,,t rn:1l.cri.11 imrlic;itiPn rei;ti; 11pnn tl•is fr,1t11rr ,.,lon<:' 
incorpor:1t:cd. This c:tn he SC'cn from tht 1 f,1ct th.1t the .svr.il1ol ·• :::> '' 
is ,1 truth f1111ctinn.1l connc'ctivc ~--•iiich cnn J,c cn,~nlctc.ly ci<:'fincd 
hy .i truth t.1hle. T 11 t 1i Ls d <:' f i n it j on • ,._. 1i i c Ii co r r cs p n n d s to th ,1 t 
7 
c:. T. I.0·.,'i:,, ,1nd ('.!!. l.;111?forr!, t•-~1n_l,_n_l_i_r:.__2:_<~_f'_i_r_. 
n,,vc•r l'i-,-,,;,~, 1rir,,1), p. 17'). 
(~JC•h' Ynr\.:: 
8 
.,f !'.:•!. ;tl)()v,·, 111,· 1,.-,•;ic l<•:1L11rl' rif l,1;:i1·:1l 1·011~a:r11!Cllt'.l: c:nrrt's-
ponds Lo till! 11;osl <..'h•111c11L;iry rroperly of i111pl icntion, that bC'i.ng, 
th.1t n f:ilsc prop;isition not be i11fL•rrC'd frpm ,1 trllc proposition. 
Tlw firsL t1;0 nhscrv;1tions :1hnvc· :ll"L'. not s11f[jciC'11t to 
:1pp:11·,·11t, Li1<' sy,;r,•111 ni" l.c1>·is .-111'1 l.:1111:i",,rd did n, 1 L l1:1VL' :1s its 
,1li_jc,:t the L'l i111i11:1t i,rn of L'>.:tL'nsion:1l r(•:1t11n~s in thci.1· system, 
h11t r;irh,•r ;111 l)ff,•ctivc liJc11cli11g of :.:h0 gt>11vr:1l svsrcm of truth 
functions wi.tll tltnt. of stronger logicol nl)tions. Th~ third oh-
scrvntion nbovc 1-.>c sh.'.111 find is sufficient to distinguish the 
l\JO forms of impl ic;ition. To .1rrivc at this post1JL1tc, however, 
1,12 sh:il l kivc tn c·mhark on ,1 murc indirect course, so ;1s to :11npli fy. 
:1s it ·w,:rc, d0,l11cihil ily .1nd trt1Lh f1111C"tin11.-1l inference. Jt sh.11] 
:1lso hl' 11L·r·c•~;:,:1rv tn i.11Lrod11c-L· rnod:11 <'<lIH'l:])L'., tll e:-:pl i<·:,tc rl1is 
post11];1tc. 
\•;e m.1y begin by citing two forms which c1cc1ir in truth 
f1111ctio11:11 pn1position.1l 1ogi.c: 
;i) I\ i:; v:1 I idlv i11fl"1Tccl fr,1111 i\. 
b) i\ 111:1l('1.-i:1llv implies I\. 
for cx:implc, if A 
,., c re' to s t ;i 11 d for "p" th c n II p v q 11 "'o u 1 d v ,1 J i rJ 1 y he in [ (.' r r c d c1 s 8 
1, y 1 1 ll, 1 , , ) •. i , · .-1 1 1 : 11-, " r .-1 "d i t i on . 
Lhis is i11t1iiLivl'ly tibvio11s. h1lt;1t m;ikcs tl1i'.; nhvio11s is thC' 
;H:cc1,tcd ,11· r:1tih·1· SL ip11l:1t,•d ('i11Jllti_v1:1t'11t nr ('('l"l';1in 101:ic:11 
9 
Llwt one o[ thr• cJi!;ju11cts he tnH· fc11~ the 1, lwle propositi1Jn "pvri" 
to be true. The point to all this is sirnplv to show ·that there is 
indeed ,1 s011sc• in which t.lcducibility is a prrpL'rtv of such trut:h 
r.:cecly s:1v "if p and i[ r t'.1c11 pvq, t!1l':1 P\'fl. '' This co11ld lc.:it.l to 
the forniliar paraJox of Lewis Carroll, in \..•hic!J the tortoise in-
(' 
sisted to Achilles, 
I f t) 
"But thats ,1 notlicr co11di.c:io1:.-1l." The pro-
blem is: do we ha ;e in our systl'r1 a symbol 1,,1hich reprc~cnts the 
relation "B is dc:duciblc from A"? 
lll're \..'L' lPc1rl to (b) nbuvL' in •.,:licli ·.,1! [i11cl nn implicD-
t,1::.; t,,n:1, 1:10,lityf: .,) bv climin0t:i11;·, ~he ;1d_iecli\'e "rn0tct·i:1l." 
The result woul .d si111ply be 11A in,plics U'' .1nd stnnd for a truth 
functional implic.1tion. The C(Jndi.tions u1w11 ·.,,Jiicli suci, 
jmplications rest are not adequate to satisfy tile- rcl.1tion 11ri is 
deducible fro:11 p, 11 bccnusc the tn1t:h imp] ic<ltion i.s t.lcpc11dcnt 
on a f1mctionc1l relntion bct11ecn th 1.: possi.blc v.1!.ucs of the nro-
rnsition ,11 v a r i:1 I,! c s . T 11 ,. r cs u l t i s t Ii :1 t such II t nt t Ii 
i1aplic:iti u 11s" :1s C:.1. Lewis c,llls li1e::1, 111usl be: too inclusive in 
ti1C'ir rnc,ining to be L'quivalcnt to 11<7 i.s deducible from p," jn as 
li•';r·:1 :1•; titL' rl'!Dticrn holds 1-·hc!lcver both p nnd q are true. 9 
Lewis Carroll, 'J'i1c CornplL!tC 1,'orl<s of L:.!\vi:; Curroll, ed . 
. A. 1-:ooll.c0tt., 1.' ii.-it Tlic Tor_t__oJ_~c' S;iid to Achille:; (New York: 
l{n11dorn 1:c,us£'., l11c,), p. 1225. 
9 I Lewis D:1d l,111;-,.fnrr , p. ::'J'). 
10 
Lik, ~•.,i:.r i.·c.• r:111 o;,~.;r•rvr sir.Jil.1r prol , lC'r1s ncrt1rr-inr . 1-:itli tlw 
wl1 J ch is C'~~!".<·nt l.1 l J v t!1c s.1mc. Con :.;I rl ,, r f o r i n s t.111 r c ti 1 C' r r or o s i -
tinns "C1C':.,1r crn:.sC'rl the Ruhicon'' .-1 n1! •·,:r"il .\rr-•:;trr•n!' 1-.•.1lkC'cl 0n t 11C' 
~~non." l.l·t' the· lormc'r h,~ p .711'1 the l :1tt, · r '1 .. thc-n in ;1r:-r0rr1.1nrf\ 
~: ()~-! i t i :, (J I tf IC' !l I, V f (111 ~; th ,1 t i n th(' r r fl r OS i t i ("\ n , "l f. i t 1 S 110 t th C' 
'' fn!ls f'V•'n to .1rrro:-: i r:1.1tC' <1 rC'l.1tln;1 hr'.t1:,:,rn .1n tC'r.C'clC'nt 
.1:111 c0n s C'fJtH·nt s11Ch t:k1t "I\ is 11C'd11c!hlC' frrnri ;\" VC't jt rlo<'s Jc.slr,-
n;ite in .1,cClr cl.111<.l' 1.·ith st-in1rl.1tC'd · rnn\-'l'ntinns, '' .,\ n'..1t<'r"i.11ly implies 
!,." '.,'hl'tlicr r 1.1t.C'r L il ir.111li.c;it:ion js ,1 LJ.11d pf 11!'.pl.ir..1tion ;1t .111 
i s not .1 'l , i_nrl' of i;-,plir.1tir->n, nr so' ·'" linlrl: j t: i :; n n · n n r <' ,1 
JO 
sh.1 l l 
he k . ft to the r<'.1 r'r-r. 
1·.'c c:.111 nm ,• lr.vC'stir .. 1tC' thr:- srr<'nr .t11C'ne>11 forr~ or i" 1T1lir.:ition 
i1•1pl ir.1l J nn 1-.•:1•; •;t 1·1't1'.'.l:hf'nr.l l1 v tlw .1.lrllt-inn nf ··1r.ochl" f11 ,1-turr:; 
v! 1icli .1rC' nnn-<': -:t( •nsion.11. ~-I 1.1 l 1 S t () S ,1 V , t) I' ·' S i f' n f O r :; tr i Ct 
i ::-pljr, ,1tin n , '-3' 
t .11' J C' , h u t r .1 th c r ·i :: d c f I n C' r 1 i n t l' rm s <' • "' ! " ' r n" :; i. hi 1 i t v ' , w hr. r c 
p n s "ihility ·is., mnn.,d!c: orc.r.,tnr nvC'r trutl1 r1inctinn.,] st.1trrir ! nt:,. 
,\ I .111 l! nss ,\ ndc · r~;p11 .,11:l ''.tic: 1 fl. "·•' I 11:11•. "F 1 1 l .-, I I T"t'n t •· . _1•_,~.--~c~i_~~~ ~~ 
l: ,~\:._i_c_ ~:~n_l~_i' !,. i. l_,,_•;.'.'l'1_,_v. ,·, 1 • ,~.,, - ,. 1 ~~, .,,,; n _i>.l"r (~ :t'',• Y,"lrl: : .-\ i" p I c-u, 11 
C1•11t11ry Crntt•;, ]')(,'\), 
11 
cr,11'.'1.:lltinn, ;ind lhnt ;1 system 1-'lio'.;f' pri111i1ivt> mocJ;1J. notjon is 
possibility i.s s:1id tll he M-hnscci ;111d sirnilnrlv :1 syslL'm m:1v Ltkl' 
II l I 
;1:; 11ri1:1i1 · 1vv ;111d be 1,-ktsvd. ll,·1WL' w1· Inv,•: 
Lc1-Jis .'.lncl Langford Lntroducc rt further 11wdal 110Li.011 int o their 
system of strict inip1ic.1tinn, tlwt is, tht• c-011<:l'pt of cc,nsistency . 
Tlw pr,1p0sition "p ·is cn11sist011L witl1 q", sy111li11li;,:ul hv "poq" l1;is 
. . . · 1 1 I I I - 1 . - I I l 2 ·1·1 ;::1 •:,• It· 1:: llt'L l'•'SS I 1 l' t,1 l l'( !IC'(' [ IL' I :1 SI l"V ,,, [ ll' ot 1,•r.. ll' 
11:IVl': 
This 111 cff'1_•t:L is tl1c- dcfi11i1 ion Pl- sL1·i,·1 i111pl LCJt i, ,11, i•.i•Jt•11 in 
terms of neg.1tio11, possibility and prod11l't. To ~ny q ·is ded11cihlc 
1·r()111 p s:1v~; tli;tt. it LS 110L pnssihle for p tu be tn •<• c111d q false. 
_.....,(p-3~q) 
LlJL' lll'g:1tio11 (lr (j IH· Lil'ducc:d from p. 
- ---- ------
l 1 
G. E. H1q.;11L'S ;1t1d ~I..T. Crt."SS\eL'll, MocL1l i.,_op,i_c. 
Co., Ltd., l 1J(i8), p. 2(). 
J 2 
L<·wis :111d L:.111i-Jnrd, p. 15'3. 
Tl1,• ()('('IJrJ-C'Jll'(' nr '=' si:111ds rnr logie.11 eq11iv;J1cnC.l' :is is p=q •• 
12 
,,--3 'I • !j -3,,. '!'Ii,· 1111111IH·1 · :; 1·1•r,•1· , - ,, i11di,·,••; ,·,q· 11J,,,1n•111~.; ['01111,l i11 I,. 
:111d I.. :-;v::iiH,Ji,· __ l._,,)'.i' _:_· l.ih•1,1iS<', prl111J"~; or (':•qlL1n: 1ti, 111s nre lo he 
1,,u1i.l 1111d,•r L Ii,· i r 1111!:il,,·r s 1-,,s;'c',·t i1·c• Iv. 
13 
1 7 . I ~ p -3 ri • = . ,--._, ( pn ,-.J ri) 
1f,. 1 
"r is srlf-consistf'nr" ]ikc 1.,•i.sC', p dcH•s not !rinlv jts nw:i n0r>1tinn. 
lH.!'.' r"'-J ' 1r. =. '"V (pnp) C": P-3~;> 
r:o ,L1 l .i ty, ., t· t1'n ti nn c.1n nrn-r he• ,1 i rr>r t I'd tr., ,•,1 r, 1 rlircc' nl' i 0r tives 
1·'C c:an ,lC:CPntu:itc LliC' .l0r,ic;iJ C'.011St'<j\lC'PCCS r.,f t 11(' f'Xistcnrr 
,• C ~ • ., . 
,.:iiic.h c,11f'<•.nric,1l lv ,1 i~tinr.11lshC's ,-trfrt · i1•1Pl ir.1tin11 fr0111 ,.,.1r:rr{,1l 
1 r1 :) 1 i C ;'Jt i P :1 • FPllm-:ing u;,n:1 tl 1 is ~-'<' c,1:1 SC'CPnillv ,1P.1lv::c t!,c-
f i n ., 1 1 v , \J 1• r :1 n l' r rH· 0 r' rl to 
thf' p.1r ., rln:~rs or strict: fr 1rlic:1tl0n .1nrl the logical import of such 
r ,1 r .1 ( ~ n :'. (' _c; i 11 f'1 n rl :1 1 (. ,1 1 r:11 1 i . 
\·.'t:: r,:;1y hc-)')n :>'-' cjtJn:: c1 d:!sti.nc-tivc' tl:,,orc111 in th<' systc·m 
of strict impli~;ition, 
17.Ul 
Tlwt ). , .. ·". 
p-:'3 q. --3 .rv(p•.--...., q) 
This theorem stc1tcs that if p strictly implie>s q, then that it is not 
\·lliat is irnport:1tlt ahout this tlicorl'111 i'. ; th.1t J.ts co 11v(•r s c which 
would be 
""V(p·rvq),---3. p~q 
C[lnnot hold. If the converse •,:ere to lrold, then a free interchanr,c 
0[ "~"for"-)" -...·c,ulcl occur, rendr.!rinv, strict lrnplic[lti.on Dre-
dunc.l.'.l.nt form of material implication. Likewise, if the converse 
of 12,81 were to hold then all the mod:11 noti0ns would be reduced 
to the simpler cxtcnsion;il co11st.1nts i.e., poq woul<l be pq, ,...._,.:•lp 
13 
..._, o u 1 <l b c ,.___.,. p , e t c • • . 1' hi s h O\,' c v e r , is contra ::-y to t h c sys t cm , 
for a 1 thou;·,h we h.1 vc theorems of the fonn 
1 S • 4 p -3 Mp 
that is, if pis true then pis possible the converse; pis possible 
implies pis true is certainly not WJ.licl. Postul,'.lte 20.01 excludes 
the free interch,111! .:c of"=::>" [or •~ 11c111d pr0hibits the reduction of 
modal oricr<1tors to t!1l.! extension.:il conr.t,1nts. l'ostul.-ite 7.0.01 
nllows th.'.l.t there be two propositions such that, if p be one of 
tlicm,thc1~ i.t :c.1vs not hing of the tn1th 0r f.11.sity 0f the other, 
i.e., q. Th,1t :!_!; to s:w, t1,.,•o propositio11s c.111 :it once be consistent 
] 3 
Lewis .:intl I.,;1n;~ford, p. 173. 
14 
and independent, for "pis consistent with q", poq is, by 17.01 
given earlier, equivalent to "'-' (p -3 ....... q); that p and q are 
independent is expressed by ~(p -j q) which states q is not 
deducible from p. Contrasting the above distinctions with the 
theorem 
15.72 p:::,q.v.p ::)-vq, 
we find that if strict implication were to be identified with 
material implication, as in the case in which the converse of 12.81 
were to hold, then 15.72 would be an exact contradictory of 
20.01~ 4 In terms of material implication, two propositions cannot 
be consistent and independent as indicated by 15.72, ergo the two 
kinds of implications are distinct if the system is consistent.* 
Proceeding to the second objective, that is, the nature and 
function of strict implication, we may begin by reflecting on two 
points mentioned earlier. To begin, we observed under (a) and (b) 
above, two logistic forms which characterize two important points 
of a logistics calculus. One emphasizes the act of making an 
assertion as in the case in which a conclusion is asserted on the 
grounds of the premises, and the other cites a relation of "impli-
cation" which holds between the antecedent and consequent. The 
first pertains to inference and generally speaking does not offer 
as much difficulty as the second. In fact, most penetrating 
14 
lb id. , p. 17 9. 
* 
Consistency of 20.01 is proved in Appendix II of Symbolic Logic. 
15 
problems of inference revolve around finding criteria for 
deciding what is to be a valid inference. The problem in this 
form shall be postponed until the discussion of the paradoxes 
of strict implication. However, the logical notion of inference 
is germane to the concept of deducibility, in as much as we shall 
find it very advantageous to subjugate a) under a modified form 
of b). 
To effect this change, we shall want the concept of a 
valid inference of B from A to correspond to a valid deduction 
of B from A. As for b), which was originally "A materially 
implies B", we shall stipulate the .modification, "A strictly 
implies B," with the intended mean:i.ng that Bis deducible from 
A. In accordance with these points, we may now ask, has Lewis 
and Langford's calculus of strict implication successfully 
achieved this result? We can give an affirmative answer, in so 
far as the above-mentioned distinctions give insight into the 
usage of a certain logical symbol, that is, what was designated 
by the 'Hsh hook~ II To explicate the usage of this symbol we 
shall need to appeal to the concept of tautology. Similarly, 
we shall . find justification for making strict implication an 
extension of truth functional logic, that is, from Lewis and 
Langford's points of view. 
Informally, we shall define a tautology in the proposi-
tional logic as a formula which is logically valid. That is to 
say, a tautology has the value T, or 1 from a syntactic point 
of view, for every possible assignment of values to constituent 
16 
propositional vnri.1hle~. A ta11tolo)~Y is true by virtue of the fonn 
of the statement. A tautology is snicl;therefore, to be a necessary 
truth which is in contrnclistinction to a proposition which is con-
tingently true as in the case when some truth function generates 
a true proposition by a possible assignment of truth values. Con-
sider flame truth functional implication, say, p :::l q, this need not 
be tautnlogical but nevertheless if pis asserted, then on the in-
tended interpretation q must be asserted. Let us generalize 
this scheme as A";::>Il "1here both A::> n is asserte<l, and A is asserted 
ns laws of the system, i.e., as tnutalogical, then H likewise must 
be asserted. \..'hnt we have i.s a distinction between p:::>q ns true 11ml 
A:=:> B as tautalogical in which case if "1e are given nva premises 
p nnd p:::>q, we can infer <I, but this is now a special case of 
15 
A ::> B, becau!le (p (p =:i q)) ::'.:) q is now n tn 1ttology. This is pre-
cisely the point Lewis nnd Lar.gfnrcl have in mind when they state 
'~,,'licnever any truth implication, plq, expresses o tautology (is 
nE'cessarily true) the relation p-3q holds: when plq is true, but 
16 
<lacs not express a tautology, P--3 q does not hold.'' 
Several examples will ·exhibit more clearly the employment of 
strict implication. Consider the following t,.,o <:'J~t•mns for 
1 7 




Le\Jis and L.1 n g L l11.·d, p. 24t,. 
Ibid. ;1. 244. 
Ibid., p. 2f-}6, 
17 
I 
15,21 p.::i. q::,p. 
15.?3 ----...p.:,. p:::iq 
15. 31 ~ ( p::ifl). ?. p:,-q 
15. 41,v( p::iq) • ~. q::::, p 
II 
15.2 p.-3. q::,p. 
15. i2~p. -3 • p:, q. 
l 5. 3 ~( p :::>fl) • ~ , p::, ~ fl 
15.L• .-v(p::,q).-') • fl ~p. 
Column I givl'S J'Cl' PO!;ttions derived in the systL' 111 of }\..1terial 
Implication while propositions under II arc derived in the system 
of Strict Implication. The employments of "::," under Column I 
which arc tlllltologicnl are cnpablc of being deduced in the system 
of strict i mplication whcrcns crnplo)inents of 11 '.::) 11 which arc not 
tni1tologjc:il, thnt i!J, cases which lnc k nsnertion cnnnot \.,c re-
plnccd by 11-3 11 • In fnct, if in Column II, the occurrences of ":::>" 
were rep laced by 11-3 11 the theorems would be false. 18 Wl .. 1 t then 
can be concluded about the no1ture of strict implication? 
With respect to the systems developed by Lewis and Langfnrrl 
we can sec an explication of valid deduction. This occurs, however, 
with respect to extcnsiorol systems in so far as the relation of 
strict implicntion holds when valid j_nferencc in some sys tern is 
possible. This is the most fundamental u~;c of strict implication, 
although it would be misleading to limit the notion of strict im-
plicotion to the expression of properties of truth-functions. 
Thn t is to s11y, we would not want to obscure the importance of 
modal opernt~r3 in their own right, so to speak. Strict implica-
tion does however, give an important distinction bet"Ween the 
cnsc in which p.::J q holds and the idea of "q's deducibility frcxn 
p". Con s ider for ' jnstnncc 15.:'1, "If p i!l true, then q (any 
18 
18 
of material in1plication. Strict implication does not allow the 
consequent to be cquivnlcnt to "p is deducible from q" nlthough 
the c0n:;equcnt .:11, a whole is std .ctly Jmplied bv the antecedent 
ns in 15.2 given under Column Il above. 
19 
CB.~PTER II I 
PARADOXES OF STRICT H!l'LICA.TIO:~ 
To thin point the symbol 11-3" h;is bei;n interpcetcJ as "strictly 
implies" but as will soon become obvious there are additional senses 
associated with this symbol. Firr.tly, there is the m1cert of 'llc-
ducibility" briefly touched upon earlier, and endorsed by r,1any 
logicians as n meaning for "strictly implies." There arc likewise 
other verbal statements for "p-3q" such ns "q is deducible from p" 
or "q follows from p" and perhaps the most fundllmental of nll, "p 
entails q". A real problem nnd controversy enters at this point .:is 
many prominent logicians take hend to head opposing stances. The 
key to the is1,uc centers on the n11:~\,cn, to thr question "Is strict 
implication the same as entailment?" The appe.:irancc of the para-
doxes of strict implication occupies a central i:o~,-~ 111 thi.s c,,n-
tt·oversy in as much ns their occurrence :i.s claimed as evidence 
for both sides! 
We should note that the theorems to be given directly arc 
dependent on a fonnnl context. Th.:it is to any, the several ex-
pressions which are considered pnradoxical occur in some formal 
system and :i.s such nrc dcrivnblc in some !lystcm. Here arc four 
19 
important formulae for considcrutio1,1; 
l)(p • .....,p)-3q 
2) q-3(pv~p) 
J ) ,_,, Mp ::i ( p -3 q ) 
4) L q::, (p-3q) 
19 uughcs ar.<l Cresswell, p. 335. 
20 
Furthermore, we shall put forth two basic forms of the 
paradoxes which occur in the systems of Lewis and Langford. 
They are 
19.74 ~Mp. -i. p ➔ q 
which states that an impossible proposition strictly implies any 
proposition and, 
19.75 -M-p . .:J. q ~p 
which states that a necessarily true proposition is strictly 
implied by any proposition. 
The formulae (1)-(4) are more general, although basically 
the same as 19.74 and 19.75 which are somewhat restricted. The 
21 
difference is dependent upon the modal notion involved. Formula (1) 
above state.,that a contradiction entails any proposition while (2) 
states that a proposition of the form (pv "'P) follows from or is 
entailed by any proposition. Formula (3) states that an 
impossible proposition implies any proposition, and (4) states 
that a necessary proposition is entailed by any proposition. The 
modal variance between 1-4 and 19.74 and 19.75 rests upon the 
restricted sense of impossible and necessary. For Lewis and 
Langford, "pis impossible" means "pis not consistent" while "p 
is necessary" means "the denial of pis not self-consistent." 
"Necessary truths so defined, coincide with the class of tautologies, 
or truths which can be certified by logic alone; and impossible 
propositions coincide with the class of those which deny some 
tautology. 1120 The occurrence of the impossible in (3) admits to a 
20 
Lewis and Langford, p. 249. 
broader scope that is, it is not limited to propositions of the 
form p. "- p, likewise in (4) necessary is not limited to (pv~ p). 2l 
Admittedly, this picture does not have the quality of crystal 
clarity, consequently a minor digression is in order. 
The questionable features of this scheme of modality rests 
upon the interpretation of both impossibility and necessity. We 
are faced with the problem of deciding whether all impossible 
propositions are in essence contradictions, and if so, how so. 
Particularly, we must take notice of the claim cited above that 
impossible propositions deny some tautology. We shall want then 
to deal with the context of modal-logical truths on the one hand, 
and applied modal logic on the other. 
Briefly, we may first take note of the fact that there are 
many modal logics. Logics which deal with necessity and possi-
bility are conveniently called alethic modality, of which the 
"S" systems are most common. The S systems are constructed by 
building upon a set of postulates. When further axioms are added, 
the systems are said to be stronger. 22 For instance we have the 
system S4 by adding to certain postulates the axiom Lp :> LLp 
while S5 is obtained by adding the axiom Mp .::>LMp to the same set 
of postulates. The system S5 however contains the system S4 
because the axiom Lp .:> LLp can be derived in S5 therefore S5 is 
said to be stronger. The development of such systems often results 
21 
Hughes and Cresswell, p. 336. 
22 
Ibid., pp. 341-342. 
22 
from a curiousity over the logical structure which is the product of 
such an inquiry. It is noti_ as it were, a brilliant intuitive 
insight into logical truths which is the impetus, rather that the 
nature of such 'modal laws' generated by some system generally rests 
in a mist of controversy which is the impetus. 
The common view that logical analysis laws bare the structure 
of reason is not forsaken however, as logicians and the like attempt 
to find application for many of these newly formed logics. A.N. 
Prior, for instance, attempted to accommodate his tense logic to the 
structure of the S4 modal logic. 23 "I shall now show that tense 
logic as I have described it, is a modal system, and that if we de-
fine M (or 'Possibly') as 'It either is or will be the case that', 
and I (or 'Necessarily') as 'It is and always will be the case that', 
these operators will meet Lukasiewicz 1 s conditions for being modal 
operators and, furthermore, will have all the formal properties of 
the Mand L of the Lewis system S4. 24 The point we care to make can 
be represented diagrammatically as follows: 
I i 
CEIi F, 1 1 ;z: S4 F, 1 1 S5 
I 2 
F, 1 2 .. S4 
00 F, 1 2 ~ S5 
Her I 1 and I 2 are interpretations for the modal operators Mand 
L, while Fis some formula constructed in them in accordance with 
the interpretation. The arrow indicates that some formula in 
23 
Hughes and Cresswell, p. 263. 
24 
A.N. Prior, Time and Modality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957), 
p. 17. 
23 
q 11L•st ion \.J1>1Ild s11 i r· ,11?1· i11l l•rprf'L1I in11, perli;q,:, u11r l<'/:i, · ;i ·I 
intuit.ions, wl1i le ;i !i.-,r :icross LhL• .irro\.J w<1t1ld rcjL'<:t till' i.11tcnded 
inU ) rpret;1tio11 \-1it:li rl' s pP.cl: tn thL· l0gi, :al strt1rture i11 '7Ue s tion 
i.e., the S!1 or S"i. Tn the tvnse-logic of A.N. Pi-inr fnr inst.-1111:e, 
\.Ji J 1 lw true' is ;ind ,1 l \vays w.i l] he ( tn1e or goj ng to be true) and 
t h i s is f.iJ s e i n th c c ;i s e :i n w Ii i r Ii p cl t' s c r i h es n r nw < • s s w h i t: Ii I i.1 s 
I . I I I f I >' S not yet 11.11· w1 SP1:1L•, ;iy slop or g<H'<. Th i • Sl. ' Cllll<I ClS(' .-,h()V(' 
could be ;.in altcr11;.it0 interpret[ltion whirh c>mplovs Llw SS structurL' 
Now t:o rct1irn tu t:!te 0rigi11.1l line 0[ t:hu11ght we c,111 nttempt 
to clarify the cunr<·rt of imros s ibi] ity. The posit ion giVL'll bv C. I. 
Lt•\•1is insisls tli.-,t impus ~:ihlc •. rropnsit in11~; rll'ny :-; 1,11w taut:nlogy ;incl 
si11CL' a ta11tolu1•,y is :1 st.:itcml'llt wlii,·'1 is tr11(' f,q· nil v:1luc .1ssi _1;11-
ments it is q11itc l,!Jv ·ious tl1 .1t .1 denial ,,f such ;_i st,1l1..'m1..•11l: sli.1!.1 1·c-
ity :111d ,·11t.-1i.lm,•11t ( :;trict impl'ic:1tiPn) h':ts cl"L~.Jl1..·d on ,in 0xtensi,1n:il 
b:is l! of rropus .itiu11:1l lngic, consequently i.mp.-,ssiblf' p,·,,pt)Sitions 
--· · ---- --- ··· -- ·----- ·- · --- ·- -- -
') C 
~ . ) 
Note: or 
i11Lvr1..' St, ht\\,', : VL'f, \,;1s tliL ' <·l>lljL'('t\ll"(' tl! : 1t· .t pr,1p1..•1· J,,i:ic nf 
time m11st ac c o1111t f<>r time ;1.c; dL-.;ci-,·t.c ,l!ld Lim,· .is C'L111L i11uc1us. 
Tliv ('(l!]t'(•pt · i(lll ()r I i111,· ;11; d j ~;cr,•t·,· J'l"l'Sllf'l'llSl' ~; tlinL i l" is 
r:1,·:111i111•.111I 1,, ::p, ·. il, "'" r i111,• in ll'rrn:; ,,1 :1 111•,d 1:1.im,·nt while 
1 i111,• . 1:: , · ,•111 i 1111,111,: :1:: ::11111,•:: t 11.-11 J,,., h'v, •11 .-111\· th'" 111,•mL'lll s t lit•rl' 
i:: : 1 rltird 1?1,,,a,·111. T,, ;1,·,· ,•m111t1d:111.• 1l1i:; di!:l i11,·t i,,11 l\-lU :;yst1·111s 
:11·,, rL'quir('d :11HI : 11·, • l111ilt 11po11 SI,. TilllL' :1:; co11t · i1111P111; i.s 
f(>fffi('d liy .-1ddi :1;~ IJl.p)l.,1)VJ.(l,q::JLp) \.JhiJ, , tim e :is discrl'tt• 
is ftintl(•cl liy ;1ddi11;: ( (p--, Lp)--,p),::) ( i'll.1>;:J l,p) Lil tl1c• Si, :i :-: iom. 
24 
t.11:c the fon : of ;1 cnnL1·adiction. 1 n t ,, n r: e 1 n r, i cs , ,1 s i n t h c c :1 s c 
of /\.:l. Pr.ior, jt r.;ce'f1s tcn;1hlc th;1t r;r.nscs of 'ir:irossihili.tv' 
coulu have :;ir,ni rir.1ncc ,_.hil<' not l1.1vi11'.'. the r·,encr.11 fnr":'. (,f 
cnn t r,'.Hlic ti.on. This IH~Hcv,'r ;i ,1tici.p;itl's th,, fo:-r.1 • of thl' 11pcominr, 
'Independent proof' th;1t .in it,,possJl>le rroro:.ition cnt.iils .1ny 
Lr.wis .1nd L1nf:ford h.1vc .1rr,11C'd th .1t thl' p;ir,1do,:es not only do 
not tell ,1p,,1insl: the system of :.trirl: ir.iplic.1tion rivinr, expression 
to r_~nu1ilmC'nt or dr•,l:1rihil Jty hul i11 f ,1ct st;1tC' .in i.mpor t·.111:.. 
\•!c t:M:c .1ny propnsjt1on •.-:hic!i 'i.~, of tlic forllt rv-vr ;incl .1s:;11:nc the 
ner .,1 ti on. "i'!Jjs :;et:; w; on our wav 7 fnr t:lte dcn:i.-il of PV"'P easily 
r,i·:cs us p .1ncl 'v r. n f co u r :; c , t I Ir. 1 es so 11 l P b C" 1 C" ,1 r n c rl i. s th., t 
if somC"onc sltoulcl r.ontr.,clict 0r s!Hl'.·.' incnnsisli:'nr.v tl1en '·-'C" sho11.lc.J 
exrcct .1nv proposition to fol low. 
ThC" 1 C':.:.nn ?ir i' i 11.c; r-i;,1s: 
i'· ,v I' ;) :o SI 11' 11' (· f I 1\1 
') 
I' r rp111 J., :;i1;:p.l i f _i r ;1 t i 011 
3 ~ r f r,,m J ' s fr1r 1 j f i C ,1 l ion 
1, PV rt f n,;n ') :1ddition •-, 
5 'l f r, 111 J .1nd I, hy cl j Sj llllrt 1. \'e i:;v 1 1 o ;', i s ri • 
Tli,, pr<>po1wnt~; nf tltis ,1rf'.t1rt<'nl ,1rf'P;1l to t·l11• i11tt1iti .vc v,11_-it?it:: of 
tlic roP1poncnt jnfcrc·nct' r 10v~s. TiiC' foJ 101.J.inr r;et of ,<;t,llC"tncnts r,iV('S 
tllrsc rules for in:,p,'.Ction. 
,\. /\nv ,onjuncti.011 C"llt,1ils r;1ch or it.:.•; cn11_j1incts. 
II. Civ<'n ;1 1•r<'p1>::iti<>n I', pv''I (";111 1>1• lnfrrr,-cl h'hc-rr• <i fi; .111v 
1>rP}'OSillo11, hv 1,H:i,.:il ;1dol!tiPn. 
C. J'rom th,:, pn•mi :;c:s ~ r :rnd p v 'I onr :is cnti . t.lccl to infer 'l 
"" th<· l'lil,· nr ,li.•:j1111ct IV(' ::\'I ln:•.i:;1~. 
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D. I~plicit to this argument is also the transitivity of 
entailment, that is p implies q and q implies r, therefore, 
p implies r. 
Tn \,·h.1t fo11cws, .1rp.ument will he given in li;·ief for the rejection 
o[ some of these rules and their success or failure likewise will 
be discussed. 
Under A we have the logicnl operation of conjunction which 
:-il1ows trt1e premises to he conjoined and conversely the operation 
o[ simplific.1tion exemplified by tl1e inference m.1de at steps 1 and 
3 .1hove. It has been .1rgued hy some thc1t the premises of on 
argument s11otiJ cl function together in en toiling a conclusion. 26 
The import of such ;:i system would be that if two propositions A 
and B, given conjoined as A·B are said to entail some proposition 
C then it does so in virtue of the joint force of both or a mutual 
functioning. A·B is not to be considered simply ;:is A is true and 
Bis true. In this form A·B would not entail A because A entails 
A, and H would in this case be superfluous. T.J. Smiley has 
attempted to modify this version, by certain modifications, which 
ultimately remove the paradoxes; however, this results in an 
awkward system. Smiley modifies the formal demand that the premises 
function to~ether. 27 Smiley offers a definition of entailment in 
26 
which the propositions entailed are contingent, likewise in this con-
text the premises are contingent. He offers t11e following definition: 28 
2(, 
E.J. NL'1s011, "Intl'ntic>n.11 Relations", Mind (1930), pp. 440-453. 
27 
28 
T.J. Smiley, "Entailment and Deducibility", Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Societv (May, 1959), p. 249. 
Ibid., p. 244. 
I 
:\ ,f--!\ if ,711<] (lt1lv jf tl:c l1iq1lfcatlo11 11 , 
:\1 + . 
"'-' (,\ 1, + + ,\) is .:i t.111tolo/'.Y, ll 
The sy:.tc'm dcvc l npcd C'mp]o~·inr, Lhfs ,1cf{niti0n for r'nt:.:i.llmc-nt 
.:i l J m, s /\ • 1', t- i\ t, n l v when /\ ,7 n cl n ;i rr~ co i:1 p ,7 t i h 1 e :-1 i t 11 o 11 c ,7 no th c r . 
This Jinc of .1rJ'.Ur!1cnt 1-.'hich r.c_jcctc; intcrn,1l]y .lnconsistrnt 
premise,, cloes stnp the 'par.7cJoxc:;' fni- on this viC'w liit' iri1possihlr 
propc,sit lc,n (1f line one •.,oulrl hP i11vnl id for nn-.· prnof. There is 
for, 
Tn th~ s.:inc 
lir.lit lwwcvC'r, '"C' c ,111 cntC'rt,7 .in Von \·.'ri,'.lit's cl.1i .f'l; "Tf one co11.l<l 
29 
not discri .riinntt~ hr•t.\s"ecn rropositions 1Jhi.ch .1rr cnt;:iilcrl ,7nd propo-
sitions \Jhicl1 ;ire 1wt entailed, hv jmpossih.lc propositi.on:.;, .invrrsC' 
prpnf c0t1ld n1.1t h,:, v:1lldl.y ro11cluc-tr·d. i·o r it i:.; csst'nti:11 to such 
prl'l1f th,7l :111 i11:11n'.;'.;!hl(• proposit"i,,11 '.;l11111ld t''11t:1il cx;1ct.l\' ~,uch ;1nd 
10 
The v.:id.ance of intcrrrctation for cnntr:.H.1iction ,1nd Lmpossi-
hil.ity c;111 t,7!-:c on different forms. F o r t h C' c ,1 r~ C! o f Vo 11 '.-.' r i r. Ii t t !i e 
inclln'.;istcnt \,ith ,7 body of lrr1owlecl1~r. Th11s, Wt' c,111nnt infer ;iny-
tllinr fron .1 c,rntr.7<1iction, on his view, cxcc'pt the ckni.11 of the 
<"<'llll".l<ii,·l(>r\' 1,r,•111ii:, .•. 111 tc·11::,, 111:•.!,·, ,,1u' 1·1[:·.11t 1\(•);ln· t0 u:~c' · 
Thid., 1'· 21J, . 
JO 
r.cnr, l!C'nrilr \'on \'ri)',lit, Ln;:_ic,1l __ St11c1ies (:':r.1-.' Yori.:: The l!umanitics 
Pn •s:;, ]~)'i7) r. 171,, 
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f o r:-:1 of ,1 c Ll n t r ;1 d i c t i o 11 . '.-'itli Sriilc;,', :il11,·1,·, thC' cn11tr:1dictorv 
p1:cmjsc is ,, i.::iplv c::c1udC'cl ;it: thr 011t!,<'.L. We ~~v nntc nt thi" 
point th e n, tl1 :1l rlcpt'ndin~ on tll<' inr .<'r11rct:1tir,n c,;,e 1n:1y .1rr,uc, 
t!1,1t a c:ontrndictorv prC'r.iisc ir:1rJ ic! , cvcr,·r- .hin .r, ;is i:; tl11= c.1sc 
w i. t Ii L cw i :; . C1n tliC' nthcr h ,111<1, on,~ r :111 :1r ;~11,', :1 c; clc1C's '.'cin 1.-.1rir,h t, 
Crom .1 c:ontr;1diclnrv. 
Anrlenrnn .incl !\cln:1p li,,vc put forth the 1:1ost 11cnctr.1tinr, 
criticio.m of Lc.•1-.ri:-' indercndcnt rr(l (l f, t'1 :1t ri , o utrn d ic:t icii1 cnto.i ls 
,111)' fHO[lOSi ti.on. /1ccorc!jnr, to tl1c .1hnvr~, J.r1-1is m11s t con:nit citlicr 
;1 f:i11;1cy pf ;11•1!.'i1: 'lity c,,· ; 1 <·irct1l :1r ;1r,:1111l•1,t hv t.llf' :1ccrpt;111cc of 
J 1 
prLnciplcs I\ ;111c\ C: :11,ovC'. 
[ o c ;1 l po j n t o [ c r .i t i c i s m . 
Tile i11fL~rcnr:r i,c:iir::F1C of,\ v H frcm ,\ is clc;1cnt!cnt on trlltli 
funrtion :11. c:011sid<'r.1t.ions of 'v ', in •.·.111i;:lt thC' f;t .1tcml'nt ,\VH is 
ll n d C' rs t ,, o cl ,1 s , c i t 11 er ,\ i s ii s s r. rt c cl or I\ is , :-i 11 tl s i 11 cc ;\ j s in 
f.1ct r. :ivC"n, tl1c cnnclit:i,111 for ,\vr; i~: f11lfUlcd. St cps '.'. .111<1 /, 
Pn \...' 1' 
not in f.1 c t, oft e n 11!,<' tile \,1cdi:e, Lr,1ns.Lltl'd ;1s 'or', in .111 intc-n-
J.~sJ.~<:-Ct'n tl'11 t i <'11 ,, f __ .-\nd r rs,,11 . ;1nd !',,, l 11.1 I'. 
31 
the nnvc to r7 . ) . Tlii.:o 
T!1:1 t i :, to r.,1v, in 011 r 
28 
ordin,1ry rl'.-1'.:n11i11;~:; l.'l' 11,,rn .11 ly fn11·: 1!1,• ,·,,1111,·,·1 i,111 in q11<·'.:ti(111 
V 
when there is snnc rc.lcv,1nce ],ct\ , <'<'11 tl1(• di,,j1mct1;. 
i11 the t1s•o-v,1lur.cl propos .itional c.ilc111u: .;, ilflrf~,11·s unriucst i()n.:ih.le, is 
rejected by the ,1uthors by the inipn ,c;it ion nf ron,]j tions :,one tno 
ohvious. It is cipp;:ircnt tlrnt a pre] i.min;irv :-iccount of the rule is 
usu;1lly c11011gll to convince son :eonl', tli:1t tlH: rull~ i.s .1c:ccrt.1bl0. 
\~hen r,iven .1 choice- het1 ,:ecn t1-·o disi1111rt'.;, ~~11r·l1 tl1 .-1t rithcr the 
first or the second is true, .Jnd fn]ln1 : inr. 11pc,11 this, /'.ivrn th.1t 
one is not tht' c.1:;e, it sct~ms unclcni:il,1 .c Lli;it tl 1(' r1;m,1ini11r, cl10ic:c 
must he the c.1sc. Thi.s, however, is 11ot the point of contC'lltion. 
h'h.it is of c:nncern, is whc>thcr the propositi.nn 'fo11.m ,·s from' the 
premU;cs, in any .lnrJc.1Jlv intercsLim: srn .r.r, ntlir.r th.in the! 
C'}:tension.11 cPnditiPn. \·.'h.1t .1ct11,1l h· l1.1r,J'L't1S is nnr· tl1r rc' _ic-rti .nn 
tions th.1t it L1ils to lie .111 infcrcnc,' f,~rJtJ. ·11i,, 1•ci<'ct'i< 1 11 nf 
disjunctive syllori:;rn i:; in accord wi Lil the rlcm.111<! of i111pnsinr. rigid 
conditions [or tl1c l0r.ic.1l notion of 'v;:i] id illference'. The drr:ianri 
in (]Uesti011 h0.j11;:, th.:it .:iny conc.lusi0n inferred from prcrii.ses must 
nnt he tot.1.l..ly irrclev.1nt; ,lily v .1lid infrn•n::c 1:n1st nnt c:omrrdt ,1 
f a.1 J .1cy or re I cv.1ncc. 
str0nr.cr rC'1.1tio:1 hrth'C'C'n ,\ .1nrl !\: 
f () r <I is j I 111 C t .i V (! r; y 1 1 () r. i ~; r:1 • 
J2 
Ibid., p. 107. 
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/1ndcrsnn :ind 11,•111.111. 111 thr pronf tliC'l"l' i!~ .111 .111il,fr.11i tY in.1s1·ll1l·lt 
JS, ,\ v H of line /.i is prnciur:cd by r.:-:tcnsi(ln.-il fe,,tttr<'s, ,,.,!11 le 
.i !.: s "tt h" (' '] t 1 c 11 t t t c; r .1 !; ", 11:iC' s n r r ;, th<' r TH'<· cl s the ' int<' n sin n ;i 1 
n 
r 1':1 t ti rl'!;'' l. l'. r,' I ,: v:111,·e:' (l r ('11 t · :i i l T'l(:!ll t:n l,l' v;11 id. 
syl lo~isni ;i~, ,1 .v;ilid mode of i.nfcrcncc is n(t(~n r:nnr,idcrcrl too 
Ji j Ph ,1 f) Ti CC t O f1 ;1 V Ji y r.1 il :l y. P,ut i( thr• dis _itl!l,tl .vc syi)nr,ism js 
to he kept, the ;ihnvc. :11·rurr.c11t rn11st. r-c ;1ns• .. :rrcc!. 
the ;ibovc ;.irr,t11!!C'nt 1,.,vc done :;o hy !i(•vr•r,1! 111rtlw,'s. The mnst 
ohv iou:.; 
., )1 d ri f h t l y s () 1 th ,1 t i f th C. C () n C (' r r- () f r e:1 CV ;in CC i :, t O f (1 rr. th C 
b.1 :;i s of n• _jcc-tir.i n ( (,r r;u cli .1 lnnf'. :1CC<'ptccl principle 1)( in(crcnci:-
t\1011 there nui ·.ht tn he ,1 ri.:· ,nrn11!; (or:i111}ntio11 nf :;1.1rh ;111 elusive 
concert. Th,1t thr•rr i!; in f,1ct such :111 ndcq11.-itc ;i11c! fnr-P .11 c:<prc s -
lt h'i 11 lll'l he disc11s:-c.d IH~r<', 1,11t 
r;1tlicr in upcrnr,inr~ :;l'c:t .ion!,, .i.n.1:-;nllrcli :1:; t!1c ,·nnrepr: nf rcle:v,111,0 
wi 11. bc foun d to l>t• :i :1 111d:1w, nt.11 fc•,1t 11r!' o( 'c•11t;1i l11cnt'. Th j s 
1-·i IL he ,1i!;c11:-:;1',I in th,• devi:-lnp1:1C'nt o( s·:i;U'n1 1 1-''. (E for ent.1i.J-
lt~l'lll) nf .-\11clr1·:;n11 .111cl 1',c• I 11.-111. 
/\notii<'1· ~;.l<!C' tn ti1,• ;itt:.1ck r,11 the c.111 for r<'l<'v,111r(' citr.d 
c .1 :1 ,· it,· th ,• critici: ;1•1 thn~: 
,11 sy:-;tcm 1:hnsc' t\1011rc!rn'.; (n11 thrl1· int<.'1HlC' .d ·int<'rprf't:itjnn) ,1r<' 
I li i cl • , J' . 1 () '., 
truths of lnfic c111i'.i1t, 11n tll!'ir int ·r-n, 1,·d !11t,'rprl't.1t ion, t·c, IH• 
V, 
V ,1 1 i. l r ll l l' s () r i n f ' . r I • : ll . C ; " 
"1 rL"'.,1r,l tlic ru]c cif i11ferr•1~cC' of 1•~;. n<>t ,1s snr,?cthinr. tlt.1t on its 
intended jnterprC't.1tio:i h.1s to lw ;1 v.11 i.d rt11C' of inference, liut 
merely .1s .1 rule fnr r.encr.:itinp, fon·,11L1'.; that, on tlictr jntended 
J:i 
tli.1t they .1rc .:ilJ goneratcd (.1nd th.1t not:ldn~ c]~;r. is).'' Thi.s 
rnr nn ti· i.s v.lcw 
the c,1.ll for rC'l.1'v,1ncc is irrc.lc•v,1nt, in so f.1r ,1f; G ,ulc of 
j 1l f Cr C n CC d ()Cs n O t li.1 V C l O h C .:i ' V ;1 1. i cl ' . r u J C O r i :1 r C r C n CC • T!1is, 
)Hy,.:cvcr, h,1s the .1ppe,1r.1ncc of;-, red licrrinf'.. To C'st:1h1i:.h method:: 
o f r, c n c r .:i t i n 1~ f o rrr. u L1 s 1 n :1 cc or d ,1 n c e •.•: i t I I LI I c c n n c e pt o f l or. 1. c ,1 l 
cc,nscri11cncL', to ,,_,;f .1h.l i:.li 'truths of .l111~ic' i.s very nohll? ,1nJ in-
tt'I"l':;tin!' .. in,kcd, hl!L the i,,);u0 here i:; ~:licti1c,r cli:. _junct!vc sylJor•.l:-111 
i:; :in ,1r.ccpl:1hlL' n1lc, hc,.:111:;L~ of ccrt.:iin cnnditinu:;. 
In ,111 f;ii rncs:;, \,1! should likewise observe that ,\!,derson :incl 
l1el11.1.p h.1vc clevcL -,j1,:•d .1 systc;,, 1,•liicli <'Xc.l11dcs dis _i11nctfvc svllogist" 
nnd 1 i hc'.J 1 :; c mncl_w; l'U:1CllS. 
cc,~plctc, cons .istc:1t ,1nd ckcitlabJc. >!:it mc-.:ininr to r.o too f;-,r :ifiC'ld 
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CCL)f[n,v 1111111,:r, ~r_1~(_n_~o;,_r_~~ (IIC'rkl'lc-v: 
p. 1 ~.'i 
l'11i1,•<'r.~ity of C:.11if., 1971),-
J c . l 
Thiel., 1'· .I'.!(, 
ne 1·.,1Lio11 ;ind cli:; _j1111c l!,111 i11 \/lifcli ,,r<1cif ~; : 1n· cn11:;1· r11('[1'.i l,v 'trc,• :;'. 
,\ fnrmul,1 or strfn/, of fpnn11L1" or ;i l1 r :111cli <'1Hi:; in C'i LliC'r tile: 
1(, 
If ,1 L1lLicy of ;in1bir.uity }wl\;een tile intL'11sir,n;il .1nd cxtcn-
sional uses ,,f the W<'du• is ;,O\lr,hl to be .1vo.ided b,, .in :1ltern;1tc 
sense o[ 'v.:1Jid f0rm of inferencc'. Ll1<•11 ;1cc<11-cli111'. to 1\11d<'rso11 .111d 
Tl 1r' ,i, ·1".111d "· i v<·n :1 l t Ii,• 
~' )' so me 'v;ilid 111,,d!' 0f inference'. If jn t.lie in cic,1rndcnt rroof 
'strict v,11 irllty' js tlic ~.ritc:rion for v;iJ irl f<1rr:1 of infcrrncL· tlten 
tlic T:i(lVC frori ,..._,,\ .1nd ;\ V n r.o B 1-:ill ),r, ,,r.c<·rt:.11 : lr. Th" r r<>l' 1 em, 
lim,o.vcr, with 1 ;,lrict · v.-,}jdi . tv', ;_•]Ji r :1 1-:n11l<! :;;iv the crit o rion for 
valid infer0.ncc h th.1t it is ne c o .<_;:.;,1 r y , t h .1t either t lH: conclusion 
be true or the rrcmlses f:ilse, th .1t the' :1rr.w1H'nl e 11rlovin r·. d!sjt1nctive 
sy 11 <'I'. I :;n1 vou ld h<• 111111<,crss.1 rv. 0n t Iii: ; v j r1-: t-. • "-' J\ 1,:011 l cl v;, l i cf.7 tc 
.:111 inference to I\, .insof;ir ;1s A ~rv;\ 11111st lie f:1lsc. Thi:.. however, 
rcndf!rs tlH! i11dep<'1H!e11t: proof superf]11p11 :;. l f I lie .i ndcp< •ndcn t 





l is tcd 1111<1,, 1· 11 :1li<,vc·. 
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essential factor of a paradox-free system of entailment. He also 
suggests that transitivity may be fundamental factor fo~ satis-
fying the call for a 'connection of meanings' (or relevance) in 
-
entailment. That is to say, the 1·imiting or re:=itricting of trans-
itivity will count in favor of or correspond to the idea of a 
connexion of meanings.38 
Smiley offers the following definition of entailment: 
A + . 1 
Ai+ 
A,. . . , A f-B if and only if the implication 
. + A :)Bis a substitution instance of a tautology 
n 
• +A'~=> B', such that neither 1-B' nor 
,. N(A' + . . . + A')~ 39 
1 n 
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Transitivity in the · above view fails in the attempt to establish 
the -middle term between A &...,f t-(A t,/ B) & ""' A, along with 
(A" B) & NA t- B. This happens because of the principle of inference 
which would validate the above, excludes the formation of the middle 
term. The actual principle would _ give only, A & Ct-( A v B) & C 
and (A \I B) & ~A ~ B, which have no middle term in common. 
In the.beginning of this section it was mentioned that there 
were several renderings for . entailment. Depending on one's position 
one might believe that strict implication and entailment are the same; 
it has been the · aim of previous discussion to cast doubt on this iden-
tification. A telling feature of this doubt enters with the 'paradoxes' . . 
35· · 
Smiley, p. 237·. 
39 .... - -
Ibid., p. 240. 40 ______ · 
Ibid., p. ·24i-. 
!' r [ n C i r l Cs . ,\s c.1n hl' seen, thcs(' :1] t·1•r11:1l i vc•;, :is in tl1C' r.isC's 
,;cvc1orcd liv _<-;:n[J0v, .In .'in l,v 01 [r:i11:11 i111•. c(' r~.1i11 ln[er011r,,_<; liv 
condi.t inn ill)' . tit(• ,·:11.:, i l1i:t' t1!" r,·l.1l i,·1· : I•' ,'t· :· I 11 l ti nn. Tit I r, 
c!;:;r nti.1] ! r•,1t11rc• ; d;•!:ircrl fnr tlw r11t · .1il c1r•11t rC'l,1lin11. Ti1c v:irinur; 
1'i1e dcfin!tin11.•; of l'nl:ii lm C'nl cit,·d c1lin\'l', 1-•l1icl1 .1rc• :1tlrJliul-
:i h le t o ~rii lcy, c:t' nlr ~r upon tltC' conrC'rt or Jo;'.ic:11 con,l'rp1cncc . 
ln s 1wlt .'.lll .'.lr11:·o,11·lt tltr conilitinns ,1rr sPlrctcd in ;'<:cnrd:rncc 
1.;iti1 t'.1,~i r .1 hi l i tv t o refinr t:,c tri1t;1 nrrs0r vi n:'. ch,1r nc u - r of 
I, 1 
r n l. .1 i 1 r.1 , • n l . 'il iis clt:1r.1cter r.1n 1,., fm111d in tl1c Lf•1-1 l!; svstC'rr.•; 
,, 
" . 
,\ t: tl1 i i; !; L,1:•r· nnc• 1•: i.p_li l 
C.1 n 1-:c: 
c11t:1fl111t•nt? T t 1-1 o 11 1 d !.; I',, ri 11 , ii tr to t I 1" J' o i n I l n r :v: pl i c .1 t c l Ii c 
isf:1ctor,,· c11t.1il111,•111. rcL1tin11 •.:ill ;•,i•;r•; L I 1 :i L U ,\ r. n t ,1 i 1 :-; II t h c n 
--------- ----- ----- -- - -- ·- ·---- ·- -- ·-
t, l 
. I h i ,l ., I'. :> V, . 
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1:; the sm:1c ;is,\ •~rricllv .i1:pliL':; !',, tl1C' :;u;•.i:c!,t.i,,n th.1t . if /I 011-
.:icccr, t.Jh] C cx:1 l j r..:1 t i0n n I rel (''J:JllCC 1 
. r 
] . t 1J C C n 11 CC' p !: 0 f r C' ] CV .'.1 n CC' i !, 
insi:.tcd upnn? 
rcfutinr the i11c!rpc·ndr11t i'rPn( o[fc- .rc-<l j,,: l.c.•1.•is .·,r.d T.,1nrrr,rc\, T)1c 
r.:11!,t he intcf:rntcd ! n to th C' d \' r iv .1 t i. o 11 .1 l :; v n t :1 :, • !',11 t lio1,• 1,pu l d 
to he nhscrvC'd is r-!i .1t ,1\ tlwur,!1 Sniilcv rc-c.c;•.1~iz, .·s the ncC'd tn s,1t-
:sfy th<' dcm:1ncl ;rJr :1 'r.onncc-tion nf 1nc~;i11.i11r,.r.' r,r 'rclev,:mce' lie 
Secondly, 
:un,'.l ion:11 h:1:;c,. lit<' pnih]C'rr. 1:ith :;llcl1 :1 tcl:l111i,11Jt' is rovidcnt in hi:; 
Tlwt the? subsequent i;ystc•ri.s ,1rc ;p.,•k,1rd i~; untlrni.1hlc, Yet the 
l,,1sic iclr,1 0f h11iltli11;• ll1c• nnn-cxt"nS!\111:11 . ~od ,11 1.nr,!c nn .1n cxlen-
sion.11 svst('m w.1s f11nd:i1~cnt.1l tn J.c1 .. ·l:;' n1':1rnaclt. ft mir .l1t jllst he 
35 
36 
c:-:r,rcssi .011 of cnt.1 i ln,('11t. 
rclcv,111cc nncl th0. ncc c ssjtv of lnP _ic ,11 C<)nsc,p1cnc0.. ;rnc1 vet i.s 
WC',7 kt•nC'd. 1r it c.111 hr' shown th:1t tlit• 1 pnr;id0xic:11' prinrirlC's .1n, 
CIIAPH'.R IV 
TIIE SYS'l'n! "E" OF ENT,\ I LMl·'.NT 
l. The llcvclop111L•nl o[ System E: 
The system to he presc11ted in \,•llnl fo] lm-:s is a system of 
"entailment," whiL'.h solves the prob] cm or the p;ir;1doxes of implica-
tion. It docs so in virtue of ;i ri~orous ,rnd s1wci;ilized sense of 
implicc1t ·ion. The rirst point to lw con!ddor.ed is tli:it, 1,1!tc•1·c:1~~ the 
horseshoe syrnhol was used to represent 111:-iteri;il implication and the 
hshlwok for strict implication, the arrow"~" 1,ill be used to 
l"l'[ll"L'SL'lll th(· logic:11 l"L'l .ation or L'llt::1i1mL'lll. Further, it wil 1 be 
c1rgued th;it the relation of entailme nt gives a proper st:itement of 
the fund.Jmental philosophical problem of implicntion. Tn the course 
of such o statement, the paradoxical features nssoci.ated with 
material ancl stri.ct implicntion ::is r,i .V L'll hy cerc1in theon'ms 1,,rjll he 
follnc.1 to he unprovahlc anc.1 in fact, rnl ion:1 I. ~rounds for rejecting 
hoth materfal ;incl strict implication ns kinds of implicc1t:ion rlt nll. 
1 L i s L h,, o I, i 11 i Ll n " f r 11 i s w r i t er , how c v c r , t ii a t th i s does no t re n cl er 
the systems prC'vin11sly djscusscd cxcr·ciscs "i.n rutility; on the con-
trary, wh.:1t is mc:1n l: ifi tha t it is perlwps simply :i mist.Jkc to cnll 
such rl'l.itions impl.icntion from :i phi]osophi.c:il. poi.nt of view. 
The system "E" for e nt ;iil.ment w::is formuL1ted by .t\lan Ross 
Anderson ;rnd Nue 1. 1). lll-.ln;ip. Tn this system, i.t is nrgued that ther e 
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c0;-;ncct i 011 l1 0t• .. •0r1 :1 ;111rl·1·r•dc11l :11111 c,,11'.:,•r111, nl. T l \.J j 1 l h (' f O 1 I 11" t ii ,1 t 
tiH' clcv0.l0pmcnt pf 11er:c's:,ity ;:is u"c•,l in ll11• sv1;t<'rn <)f J.,,1:!t; .111d 
i s t h (' r:crn c1 i t j n n t i, n t i r /\ C 11 t ,, j 1 •; I', • l 111' Tl l\ i s r (' 1 (' V ,111 t l (1 I\ • 
cons0.rita~ncf'. \-.'e: slin11ld .1sJ:. 011rsl 1 lv0:;, i1\ Lil[:; conncct!.011, i-1h.1t 
fe,1u1rcs we require to er11,]ov this cnnc, .'pt prorcrJv, sn .1~; to /'.ive 
propl'r c~:pre:s:~ion to the .:ibovc me:11tio111~cl cc1 nditi .0ns, wh .lle ;it the 
s.1me time cJjnLin,1ti11.r. t!1r u11cfrsir.1hl0 fc:1tur0s .in CL'rt.1in .11 tcr11,1-
The r.1n:,l ohvious result yicl1h .111 i.11tl~rrrr.t,1li<111 
f()r such k1~y concopl.', ,1:; "[01J .01J<; frnn1'', "irnplic:;', "is dr.d11c:iblc 
frori", "thcreforr", etc., in nur lnr.ic,11 loc11tlc,ns ;,bout our de:(!uct:ivc 
The: fnr111ul.1 forrricc1 /\::;, (I~ ;:::, :\), 1: 1dcll c;in J,r.~ interpreted 
i.f /1 i.s trur, then ,\ follows froM ,1ny :,r1,itr"1rv n, is .1c-c0pt.1lile in 
the systcn1 nf m:itcrL1l i.1:1pllc.1Unn; it i!, :10.t .1ccc~rt,1hlc in t11e 
Tl1c vrry J.111r,uc1:'.<' in ri110!,tin11 i,: un.1cc-cpt.1hl0, in so f.1r 
,11; .1 true ,\ docs 110 l f 01.1 mv from .1ny ;1 rh J t r.1 rv con tinp.cn t n .f n ;inv 
prorrr sense of "fol . Low fror1". 
In wh,1 t f o 11 ow~;, the sys tcrri E i-·i 11 h0 prf':,Cn t('rl \d t 11 .1 t tc:i t ion 
L'!;p1'cf~1l Iv 11 11 tlw dl'vl'lopmcnt of tl1c <lcci'11ct ivc .1pp.1r.1tui:. Tn the 
l,nt:h ncc:css lty ilncl n•Jcv,1nc0. 
1. llC'cluct i.vr ~IL'tlwd 




Th;1t is tP :;;1v, tJi,, nther connccti<,ns 
ivill he or.titted, i..r., the con_juncti<'n m1d rlis_i11n,:-t[nn ,1s 1-;p)l ;i:, 
th0 ner;ition si~•.n. :,, n th h r ,1 ck r t s :m r! "c Io t. s" 1, i 1 1 Ii 0 11 s rd in the 
form,1tion of for~1ll,1s. llots ,1re to lie t'lllt•n•rl hv conventl.on from 
the left. 
!, 7. 
The folJm,•in1•. nile;; ,1re tP 1,r, u:~ccl: 
i\. llvp<1tli,•:;i:; (ll: :11,) i;; thr :1,;:;t11":,t i,,n 1'11[ f,,nh i11 c•ith,'r 
th,• h,·1•.i1111i11_,·. ,1r !11 :1 :;,iJ,(1r.!l11 :it,· 1'r·p,,r. 
IL l-:cpctitJon (!'.,-p.), .1llm,•s the rcpc;1ti11i'. of premises in 
t ! I C :3 ,1 T'.lC' r r O O f , 
C. f-r.'itrr;ition (!~cit.), ,1l1m:s t!1e rrpc.1tin,", of prc 1ds es i.nto 
suhprnnCs. 
ll. Fnt,1ilnwnt: lntrocl11ction ( ➔ l), .11101-·s the .:issertion o[ 
,\ ➔ l\ 1Jl1r.•11 II is rlcducih]P fr,1r.1 i\ in tl 1r' r'rnof sclwr 1e. 
r.. 1-:nt.,1i.lIT:l'11t I:J indn.1tion ( ➔ F), .11 lows the inferrncc of 
I\ f l'l\111 ,\ i-·h,·11 1,•,· lt;l\,'(' ,\ -) I',, 
m:1y first o\i:;r•rvl: tl,, _, V('ry :,ir.iple prc1t1f for t.111.: l.1w of iclQnti.tv. 
J-: 1,vp l rep 
J i\➔ ,\ 1-2 ➔ T 
This si mple proof exc rnr J lfi(,,, tl\P. h,1sir: usc- of hypothesis, r0p-
C't lt:fcm, ,111,l l'nL.1il1•1L'llt lntn1clu,rfo11. 
I ·1 
' · 
1\tHkrson ,,nd Tleln,111, "Ent;-1.flr.il'nt", !'· RO-RI,, 
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consists of tile following two axioms wi. th entailment elimin::ition. 
II I A-} l\ -"> :\ 
(!\ -, . II -) C) • ;\ -} I\ -> ·i\~ C 
lll is Lhe L-1.mili.1.r ptirndox and is proved by . the above five rules as 
Lt:\ ') r½' - . \ 
J . ,\ 
/1. B--,. A 




2-J ~ r 
1-l, -"> T 
,\t1d(•rso11 :111el lkl11 :1p point out th.it this is not ;in jn sta nce of 
enttiilment, "For if A is contingent, then A-;> · H ➔ A s<1.ys that 
:111 l'lllni.lmL'nL I\ ➔ ,\ fpl]cll.Js from or is lkdul· ·ihll' from ,1 cont ingent 
proposi .tiL1n - in d1.•Ci:1.11.L'.e of the cnndition tli:1t l(ffm:11 co11s.lclcc1tions 
. . ,,Ii :i 
c1l.011c v:1..1.jdatl' - v:1.licl 1nt·crcnces. l·>,S L'llti:1lly, Lhc. :1liov,' fcll"11111l:1 
in no way gives any acceptable form of implication. The fact that 
011e utt ering suL·lt a formulti wi l.1 not pre>clue'.C! .:1 f.'.1.1.seliood does nol 
j11stify tlil' use of "i111p1.il'S 11 i.n this :nrrnula nor ;111y acceptable 
sense of dcducibili ty of A f rom 13. 
th :1t f,1nrn1lns 1 ikc lliC' ,1lHlVL' IllL'ntit>11cd 1s1 ill ht' Pmittcd. Tltc missinr, 
element is 11.L'CessiLy . Th,lt is, t!tc m,HIJ[ic.1t:io11 must ~~u:1r.'.lntec that 
log:ic:11 truths sh:1Ll he ncc ess .'.lry and not contin~>,cnt, "These 
co11i;idc•r:1tions sui·,i•,,•sL tlt:it we' slw11ld liL' al.l.01.Jcd tn jm11c1"!:"'t into·.'.l 




i . l' • ' Is'(' s I 1l 1 I I 1 cl 
rPiterc1tc only cntai]ments. 1144 
... 
The system so modified, c:,111,'.-d hy t:he ,rntl1nrs S4r, is 
l • r 1 1 · 1 r r 1 · ' st 4 5 Tl(.'/;C ;)Xl(llllS Pl"lll I)(' imp ic:1t1on:1 . LJgffiL'llt ll ,('WlS S, '· 
I\ ➔ 1\ 
(,\ _,., ·II-} C) -,. ·/\ ➔ I\ ➔ · /\-'> ('. 
/\~B~·C: ➔ ·/\-"?TI 
The systt'm so modified, however, h;is irs own pr.ohlerns as was 
discusse,l 111 prl''.'ious ch;iptcrs. The prnblcm being thc1t :wy necess-
altern:ite deriv:itinn from th,2 mod ·ifipd ruh•s givc-s: 
I fl liyr 2 A ➔ i\ nxiom 
II-) ' :\ -') /\ 1- :> -)! 
fn the cx,1r.ipl.c, tlw drriv;1ti0n is valid by the rules given. It is 
unconvincing }}()w1•ver, tlwt /\-}I\ fo11nws, in c1nv inter0sting sense, 
from IL Amkr~;n11 :111cl llt>lnap sug) .',<'st t kit tile above proof L1ils to 
lbicl., p. B7 
11, i ti. , 
, . l l I "r " . ,, r t:1r:c scr1011s y r 1c 1-·n1·1 rom 111 pn,o rr,1111 ltypotl1C"S('S. 11 Tile 
,,·liich would allow the keeping track of premises nnd their usage, 
1 '..-1li;it is 1,1,1ntcd is ,1 system [or 1,1l1ir:h t h ere is ,1 provoh1c deduction 
Ll1oorcm, to tl1L' effect tli.1t there C':dst:s :1 r1·()(1f nf B fron: the 
hypothesis A if ;ind only if A -) B is provabl .c. ,,/if, 
A s11lisc1·ipting procC'durc i.s 11scd to kL•cp track of the premises 
ant.I to mark thL•ir entry into 11s.1gc. The rclL'Vi111cc jnclicPs .1rc 
IISl' the"' ➔ l" rull'. The n1lcs ,,hil'.11 fol.lows, i.nsure th:1t if J\~ B 
th c 11 A i ~; r l' le v: 111 t to fl . L, 7 
l.. E;1ch ltypothl'sjs i .s g ·ivcn n distinct m1mcri1~al s11bscript 




From :1 proof of B:1 from l1ypnt:hL'Sis A(k)' 1,l1crc k is in 
:1 , to i11fl•r J\ ➔ B ;i _( k·) 
HPi.tcr;iti1H1 :111d repetition retain suhscdpts. 
The following proof of trnnsitivity is offprcd .1s cx;imp1c: 
1. A ➔ Bl Ii YP 







1· L' i t° • •). -
5. AJ,'.!. { , ' J ~ E 
1, () 
Thi cl., p. C) () • 
L, 7 




/\ --::, II I reit. 
7. B 1 , 2, :3 (i, 5 ➔ E 
8. ·C ~ !\ l, 2, >, ,, ➔ I. 
9. C ➔ I\ _,. .c ➔ I\ 1 ;~' J-8 -!> T 
J () • 1\ -) 1\ _., • C ➔ ,\ ➔ C n l, 2-9 -, l 
/\11 ,1xiom;1tic cou11LL'rpart w,1s devL•ltipcd by Alonzo Church ;ind 
c.illed 11WL'ak positive implication.il. proposi . ti.onal calculus." The 
I, 1 l i\ 7" I\ 
1{ [ 2 I\ --') I\ -) C -4 I\ --'> ·C T\ . , ___,. 
1'. I J ( :\ ~ • B --!> C) - • B --'> . :\ ~ C 
I{ l !1 ( ,\ _.,. ·I\ ~ I\) ➔ ·I\ ---> II 
,\nd e rson :-ind BL'lnnp call l:his system!{[, whil e the naturnl deduction 
ver s ion is rcfern•d to as Rr'~. The R, of cours e>, is mea nt to s .i.gni -
fy rcl cv:111c:e. 
In e· i !.:lier ,,JS(', Llic conditi<'n of relev:rnc ·c is given form;il 
t·:-z,,1·t•:;sit111 i11 .111 :1,·t·•·l'l;1h!t• 1°.-1s hit,11. 'l'li:1t: Llii~; 11,1t iPn pf l'L'll'V;111cc 
.is plii.!o sti phi.t·,11.ly ,l<'.<'vpl:,ilil c Hill he co11sidt>1·ed in wh,1t follows. 
ThL' svstc'lll 1,1 '~ dc,es h.-1,·L) its pn,hlems such l"h,1t it i.s not p1·op(.'rly 
nn cntailr.ient system. for i n this form ,3 vory obvious rnocl.11 fallc1cy 
occurs. Tl 1c.:: S systems of modal logic discussed i.n earl:i.e1· chapters 
th: 1 l. i s , 11 l' c' L's s a r v 
lhicl .• p. 90. 
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,., 
tn1tlis ;ire• t;111L1,l1>)',i,·;1l tr11tlis. The• svslt·m 1~1 ignores s11ch ,:011.,;i-
dL'l":Jtjo11 l1r lll'C{'SSil.v hv ll10 fnll,11"i111: tl1,•, 1 1·,·111. 






1 rc ·i t 
4. l ") 2, 3 E '~ 
s. ·A -> A-> A1 2 - I, ~l 
(,. A -? ·A ➔ 1\ --> A l - 5 ➔ l 
·/\ __., A ~ A is given i,y Anderson ,incl l~vln:1p ns the clC'fini.tion of 
TliL' nll'.111i111: is th:1t [f A is ncccss:11·y, then A follm"s 
fn,m ;1 11,gicnl truth. The ,1llthors nrc quick tn point out that from 
is e~uivalent to t lll1St' in the systems of Lc1,•is ;ind L.Jnf,fOllrcl. ·'19 
The most obvious results suggests that the condition of 1w1'.cssitv 
he combined with the rcll ~vancc conditi,,11. This is p1·cc.LsL'ly tlH' 
r.lL'Llllld of ;1rrivi11g ;1L the s ystem E. 
n1l1·s so 111odificd :1rt•:'.j() 
1. ~!.Yl?.· A step 111:iy h,~ introduced as the hypothesis of cl new 
subrrnof, ;ind e:1ch new hypnthesi.s n•ceivr-s cl unit class 
[r:~ of nunier .ical subscripts, wlwrc k i.s new. 
2. _P'_l:l'..• 1\1 may be rcpc:iu•d, retaining the rclev~rnce indices 
;1. 
!1 (I 
·. \11dl·rst,!1 ;11HI l\l'l11:111, "l ·:n t: 1 i l111l·11L," I'• 1) 5, 
'j() 
I_I, id_., p. 1JJ. 
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J. l i cit. (/1--)-!\), 1 ri,1: 1 he rrir,~r.: t l'd, rl"'t;iin!n~ :1. 
I 
.) . 
The fol 1 owJnr, r roofs ,J rr. .1'.i vr.n fr, r I n~;prr t j on. 
Sp cc i ;1 l j z c cl 1\ s s e rt J on __ _.,__ ____ _ - ---- -- ·- --
l. 1\ ➔ B 
l 





A ➔ II 
1 
,\ ➔ I\ 
.l '2 
,\ -"> B -) • 1\ ➔ ll ➔ • ,\ ➔ l1 
T r.rn:, i t j Vi t V ( r-: 11 f f 1 Xi Tl f") ----- - ·-- - -- - -~------- -- ·---- ._. ·-
1. ll ➔ r, 
) 








(i • n ➔ r. 
') -
7. C 
l, 2, 1 
(J 
ll ➔ C " . 
1 , 2 
q I\-) C-, !)-)' C 




re- i t . 




2 re i_t. 
1--7 ➔ T 
] - 1) ➔ J 
45 
to 
1. '' ➔ I'. 




















1\ --} (' -> I) ~ \. 
1 







n ➔ r 
/. 
fl ➔ r 
'i • ,, 




1 7. .1 -') 11, ➔ r -) l ~ n ➔ r 
1 
1 .'\ . I 1 ➔ l\ ➔ ( ,\ ? • fl --> r:) 7 ( /I ➔ . I) -> C) 
45· 
1,"". 
1, ~~· f' • 
1 i-,• i ~ . 
I,, 1 ~ !~ 
? re it. 
r,. (, -) r: 
"\ 7 -'> l 
:1-P. -> T 
1, \" r . 
1 n rr:'i t. 
11, 17 ~ r 
tJ. r, • i t·. 
11, !!, ~e 
l n--1 (-, ➔ l 
r L' Jc 11 l Ii c co 11 c I u :; ion in q u L~ s t: i o 11 . Tt is Lo lie ohservl'd jn f:ict, 
t:k1t: lill' pr11pf rnr transi .Livitv : 1!; i•.ivc•n in 1· l1t• :~ec-01HI proof 
fnnns lliC' first: tlllll' steps or llil' third 11r(1,,r. TliL• su!,script of 
livplll!i,,~;c•s f1n11· ;111d live ,._,Jii1L• the sc'co11tl :111cl third ll\'pothcscs 
An axinm:1tic countcrp:irt. exists 1,J[tli tile following axiom 
scl1em:1: 'j I 
5 I 
Enti!ilmenl. 
F.l /1--'>/l -')P. ➔ 1>. 
F . 2 1\ ➔ t _., · 1: _., C ➔ · ,\ ➔ r. 
F • I ( .t.. ➔ · ,\ -"> n) ➔ . _.\ - ) H 
C,111_j lllll' L lt)fl • 
F • f, ( .'\ /\ TI ) ➔ ,\ 
f.5 (/1/\P,) ➔ !"\ 
F.(, (-\ ➔ P.)_,,\ (1\-) C) ->. /I-> (r." r.) 
F.7 ~l/1 /\N", -3) !, (fl. ,\ l'.) ['::\ == r!f (,' ➔ ,\) ➔ ,\_] 
r. _,, 
r n 
F. J 0 
!·'.. ll 
,\ ➔ _., v", 
l', -, ,\ y I~ 
(-' ~ C)I\ (n-,. n ➔ (,\yl')-> ('. 
,\ I\ ( n V C) --,. ( ,\ /\ ll) V C 
Alan Ross Anderson, "Some Open Problems Concerning the System 
E of Entai]ment", Acta Philosophica Fennica, FASC. XVI 
(1963), p. ]4. 
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Negation 
E.12 A ➔ rvA ➔ ,._.A 
F.13 A ➔ ~B ➔ B ➔"" A 
E.14 ~-- A ➔ A 
The above (preceding)_ fourteen axioms give a version with 
the truth functional connectives included. The rules of modus 
ponens and adjunction are emplcyed in this version .. 
2. Concluding remarks on the system E. 
The system E of Anderson and Belnap is designed to e·xplicate 
the concept of relevance while securing necessity in inference. 
The authors thereby reject rr,aterial and strict implication as 
entailment cdlculi. The authors have thus attempted to gi~e the 
conditions for the assertion of A ➔ B where the formula is read 
'A "entnils" B'. A motivating feature is suggested by the 
following statement. 52 
52 
The irnplicntinn p~ q c:in be :rnserted, if and only if 
we possess a construction r, which, joined to any 
constr.ucticn proving p (supposing that the latter be 
effected), would automatically effect a construction 
proving q. In other words, a proof of p, together with 
r, would form a proof of q. (Hey ting).' 
Now, if "the implication of p::, q can be asserted", 
rne;ins Hhnt 11eyting says, then the arrow of entaiJmen t 
answ~r exactly to the notion of ''would automatic<1lly 
effect a cnnstructicn of", whereby "ans~·ering exactly" 
v:e mean that 
Ibid. 
The above staterrent does give an intuitively acceptable 
statement of what is at stake in the development of the entailment 
relation. As js seen by the preceeding material a proper concept 
cf relevance was required. For explication of·the concept of 
"rclcv~mcc" or "conncetion of rr,c<1ning" the. follm,ring two condi-
tions justify an affirmative response, for E, to the question, 
"roes the forrr.al system establish relevance between antecedent 
and consequent in an iIT_plication?" 
1. The subscripting technique e».l)resses that for A to 
be relevant to Bit must be possible to use A in a 
deduction of B from A. 
2. If A ➔ B is provable in E: then A and B share a 
varic1ble. SJ 
TI,e first condition is both necessary and sufficient, 
while the second condition is necessary. The second condition is 
proved by the following matrices: every aJdom trikes a designated 
(+) value for all assignments to its ,·ariables and the rules of E 
preserved this property. If A ➔ P is such that A and B share 
no variable, then there is an undesignate.d value assignment to 
A. ➔ n. For ex.imp le, assign the vnlue +1 to the variables of A 
while n takes the value +2; then A will be ±1 and B will be ±2. 
Hm,.'ever, :!:1 ➔ ±' 2 takes the undesignated value -3. Hence, if 
A ➔ B then A and B share a variable.5 4 
53 
54 
Anderson and Belnap. "Entailment", pp. 101-103. 
Relnap, Noel D., "Er~tai lment and Relevance", Journal of Symbolic 
Logic, 1959, pp. 144-145. 
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A ➔ ~ I\ NA Ml\ 
-3 -2 -l -0 +0 +l +2 ·I 3 - -------- - -· --- - ---·----- - --·-· - -·- - - --
-3 +3 +3 +3 +3 +3 +3 +3 +3 
,., 
+J -3 -3 - .) 
-2 -3 +2 -3 -2 -3 -3 +2 +3 -2 +2 -2 -2 
-l -3 -3 +l +1 -3 +l -3 +3 -l +l -l -l 
-0 -3 -3 -3 +0 -3 -3 -3 ,.3 -0 +0 -0 -n 
+0 ,., -2 -l -0 +() +l ,2 +3 +() -0 +0 +() -,\ 
+1 ' 
..., - l -1 ., +l -3 -IJ I-] - 1 +1 +l - .l - , ) - _1 
l :' " 
., -; "' -3 " i:~ +~ +? - 2 <? +2 - _, - -- - - - _, 
+3 ,., -3 -3 -3 -3 
,., 
-3 +3 +3 -3 ➔ 3 +3 -..) - ,) 
A/\ G Av 8 
-3 -2 -l -0 +0 +l +2 +3 -3 -2 - l -0 +0 +1 +2 +3 I --- -- ------ --- ---------·-- -·--- ·--- ---- - -- ---
I .... , ,., 
" " 
.., ..., ..., 
-3 
..., ' -2 - l -0 +0 +l +2 +3 -_1 1 -_1 -J -..) - _1 -..) -j -..) -3! -3 
2' ,., -2 -3 -2 -3 -3 -2 -2 -2l -2 -2 -0 -0 +? +3 +2 +3 - I -..) 
- l -3 -3 -l - l -3 -l -3 -l - l I -l -0 - l -0 +l +l +3 +3 
-01 -3 -2 -l -0 -3 -l -2 -0 -01 -0 - () -0 -0 +3 +3 +3 +" ,) 
+() -3 -3 -3 -3 +() +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +2 +l +3 +Cl +l +2 +3 
+ 1/ -3 -3 -l -l +0 +l +0 +l +l +l +3 +l +3 +l +l +3 +3 
+21 -3 -2 ') -2 +0 +0 +2 +2 +2 +2 +? +3 +3 +2 +3 +2 +3 -..; 
+31 -3 -2 -l -0 +0 +l +2 +3 +3 +3 +3 +3 +3 +3 +3 +3 +3 
I 
I 
Desi(Jnated values +0, +l, +2, +3. 
The system E of Anderson and Belnap has been received 
favorably among contemporary logicians. Most literature on the 
system shows earnest attempts to find applications for the results 
obtained. Some critics do however exist. The nature of the 
criticisms requires two avenues of approach. First there is 
concern over the omission of disjunctive syllogism. Secondly, 
there has been concern over the validity of the relevance condi-
tion. The criticisms over the rejection of disjunctive syllogism 
are sufficiently covered in Chapter III. 
The relevance condition is discussed by Donald J. Hockney 
in an article entitled "A Vindication of System E." He gives the 
following form of the relevance condition: 
"If A and B have nc variables in common, 'A entails b' is 
rejected as a theorem of the system. 1155 
Critics have attempted to reject this postulate by insisting 
that the postulate cannot accommodate all entailments. Consider 
the following case: 
"If something is blue, then something is colored. 1156 This 
is offered as a case which cannot be handled by the above postulate. 
Hockney points cut however, that the relevance postulate is given 
for a propositional logic, and consequently is not 
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Hockney, Donald J., "A Vindication of System E", Logique et 
Analyse, 1962, p. 480. 
lb id . , p . 4 8 3 . 
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designed to deal with analyzed propositions. There is no reason 
why a reconstruct on of such examples as above cannot be performed 
prior to the application of the relevance postulate. In fact, to 
properly extend the use of the entailment sign for predicates logic 
would seem to necessitate an entire system of definitions to in-
traduce non-logical descriptions. This general method is dealt 
with by Carnap in Meaning and Necessity. 
Robert K. Meyer in "Entailment" has argued that the system E 
of Anderson and Belnap is fundamentally correct. More particularly, 
it is the claim that relevance between antecedent and consequent 
is needed for entailment which is correct. 
Meyer is especially impressed with the development of 'rele-
vant implication,' (see previous chapter). To accent what the author 
sees to be the more important issues of relevance he develops a logic 
of irrelevance.' This mock-serious system allows any arbitrary 
'p' to be a theorem. In this system the author points out that all 
our "logical intuitions" break down. Analogously, our locial intui-
tions break down over the inference of an irrelevant p from any 
contradiction whatsoever. The system of irrelevance produces 
inconsistency and so is apparently useless but systems which 
incorporate the paradoxes although they do not produce inconsistency 
are not harmless. 57 
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Underlining the problem is the inadequacy-of the conditional 




relation. For Meyers a system may either "~xpr~ss" or "indicate" 
entailment. A connective indicates entailment when it is held 
metalogically true that A entails B if and only if A ~Bis a theorem. 
A system ,"expresses" entailment if and only if A ➔B means that B is 
a logical consequence of A. Meyers analysis rests upon the semantical 
tool of "metavaluation." "Briefly, a metavaluation V for a logic Lis 
simply a function from sentences of L to T, F that respects truth-
functional connectives in the usual way, but which has the property that 
V (A➔B) = T if and only if A ➔ B is a theorem of L. A logic is co-
herent if all its theorems come out true on all metavaluations; co-
herence, in view of the remarks just made, appears to be the least 
that one would expect of a logic that purports to express entailment. 1158 
The system Eis coherent, while classical truth in functional logic is 
not. 
The heart of the problem still remains making A.:, B true on any 
interpretation which makes A false. Meyers in fact points out the 
associated problem of counterfactuals mentioned in the next chapter. 
The results seem to be the exclusion of a counterfactual logic at the 
outset. 
Further credibility has been given to Anderson and Belnap's 'E' 
_?X _ _!:he work of Kenneth W. Collier. 59 In his paper "Physical Modalities" 
and the system E, Collier has attempted to integrate Von Wright's 
binary modalities with the entailment forms of E. Collier 
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Collier, Kenneth W., "Physical Modalities ·and the System E", Notre 
Dame Journal of Symbolic Logic, 1970. p. 185. 
has appealed to E to avoid the problems of material implication found 
:!_n Von \\'right's own attempts. 
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CH/\PTER V 
CtlNt: !.US l l' i'\ 
The purpose of this thes i s ,,,~is to explic.1te cert:iin fund;i-
mentnl features of implicati.on with special nttcntion to the 
entailmC'nt: relation. Ins o far ::is Lii"is w::ii; dont', certain :ipparent 
results emerge. I n t he first p l ac e , insi ght is gained into 
certain elp mcnls llr l,ur lo g ical Jo,:lllions. SL'l'ondly, t!ic C()ndi-
Lions fo1: tile cst.1i>lislimcnt or :111 L11Luit:iVL'ly ;1c,·L•1)t:ilill' L'11t:1il-
1ncnt relation ;ire given. i\n<l finnlly, ;i constituent of the second 
result surface s ;is a fund ,imental. philosophical- l ogical issue. That: 
is to 1;;1y , t h e' p r oh lc.·111 of t he co mmon.11:ity of meaning her.ween :inte-
cited above. 
The CllllL'.L'pl or implic:1t:io11, which i:, 011(' or t:IIL~ mnst ru11dal11L'llt::1l 
co nc e p ts of lo g ic, has be e n the ch i e f c oncern in this research. 
Three symh o ls k 1v c, hccn used t o represent thi s re l ation - they \vere 
t:lic m.1te1-L1.l implic:it ·i o n sign "::, ", the strict implic il tion sign 
tt --:3 II :rnd th,, t•nt:1ilmcnt sign, "~ " Tn L':1ch of the s e, certain 
pcc1d L11: p1-op('1-t: i cs ;trc possL'SSc '.d. 
t1C S l' ('c i:11. 1; i ).~1 i fi c :1nce :is t he c o ncept 0f conserp1,•nce. The 
c ornlit.i o ns for the emplo yme nt of th e above-mentioned s ymbols l i mtt 
the 11se of the n•spc,t.ive symbols. Tile v,1r-L1nc e of ;ic:c:cptnblc 
LliL' systemi; dlscuss c>cl 
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T l11• sr· con cl svc: Lt' l11, r· l1c• .~vs tr •1:1 nl · s t ri ,: t in 1-
pl Lcation, is a stronger s_yst.:.•m of impl .ic;irion and does not 
contain the analo g tll~ of p;) (11 :>p) which would be p--3 (q-, p). 
ThL' third sv~tL'f!l of ·implication, the systt>m pf c,nrailmcnr, differs 
from tht' sc•cP11d in ;1 simiL1r f;isliio11. '1'!1;11· ic; lo .s:1y, );tll'h 
f <"•rm tilet s ;i s L p --, ( q -, p ) d o 1wt \1:1v t· :1 11r t•v:1l1 I,· :111:1lll) ',11t'. 
Another point of greater significc1nce surrouncls the parodoxi-
c ,11 featur e s of the first two cl.1sses o[ implic;ition. lt is un-
necessary to reiterate here what has nlr c ady been discussed in the 
nppropriaLc se l:tions c;irlier, hut wh.:it n ee ds to he mentioned is 
l"h,, v :11· i :111,·,· 1:1 11::.1:-.,' tif L'L't· t; 1i11 l , ,); i,·:11 l ,1,·uLi t'11:; , h' li l'll 1,1 L' s :iy 
'A follows from 1\1 \,'L' should kN'P in mirnl the 1'rt'JlL't· contc:-::t, if we 
h;ivc nn - implic:1tit1n ,d scheme in mind. This docs n o t mean on e must 
have a s e t of properties say, Fl, F2, F3 for the clifferent de g rees or 
senses of implic;itiL111. The po int is simp]y, thnt e ven tllP advnnred 
student o f h11; ic ,~liou l d not f or ;et w',1a t th e ele me n tary texts of l o gic 
f; : 1y or 11 !";1ll:1cics (lr 1·clcvi.lnc v ." 
,\11y ;1llt• mpt: t,, int·tiqwr ;1tc lllL';11iing i.nl :o lngical fo nn i.!.lism, .'.l.S 
,,'i.Lli the ca se of tl1c~ calculus o[ L'nt;:ii.1m c nt, must come lw :1d to bend 
with th e va s t ran ge pf probl e ms clustc1 ·cd arou11J su c h a c on c ept, as 
mco nin g . The ilnaly s i s of mec1nin g lia s lH~l'll recen t ly a c o mmo n s ubject 
or inquiry in m:111y pliil,>sophical c:ircll•~;. l~c crH1lrl not here survey 
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;_i] L l:IH· pnssihi I it ics and then1·i<'!; :111d f11rLlll'r111or0, tll'L'd 1wl. l\11t 
Jiscussl.;d e,11·lic1·, c•mploys rel.evn11cc ;1:; ;111 essL•ntL..11 i.11greJicnl. 
/\ rurlimcntury feature of concern, a11cl nften oh_iectio11, centers _ 
time]css, unch:1n~i.11g detcrmi .11:H:y. 
~·stabl i.shing Liiv h;1sic f,11·111 ,1r :1t IL';1:;t tlw modL', hy which any 
furm:11 l"l'jlr<'S<'llt ·:it : ivt• of 111t':1ni11g c:111 lie• :1s!;i111il:1tcd i11Lo our 
:i. n tel 1. cc t 11 ;i l :1 c t ·iv i l: y . 
pf the t,·rms 1 mL~;11iing, 1 '1:clcv;11H:e', L!Lt·. prL'SL!11ts m:111y difli<·t!l-
l ics hc,:111'. -,<~ of tlH! t<.'rl!ts' v,1;,,1ir0 1H'~:s, ;it; sucli, 111 r,c•nL·r·nl clisco11rsc 
i 11 wh:1 t: l°<l I 1 (11.Js. 
{) f t L' 11 s l I C Ii ; I t () p i C b q•, i ll s b y s t .'.l L i 11 g t 11 :l t s ti C It :J s ti hi C (' t i s 
dvpc11denl ,>11 t:lil' n:tL11re or :1 prp11,1~:it i,111. 
:1 prPp,1:,iLin11 di .spl:1v, slt<>W, ()f" i11 SPlll(' \.J: 1\' , ·. 1pt111·,, tit,• ~;,,-c:111,•d 
"sense" o f n sent c: 11 c e? Indeed, if t:l1e proposi.t:ions ;ire to he 
r,'Lttcd, ,ts in ti:,, c;1sc of .'.ltll:<'cedenL :ind consequent for th(> 
<·11t:1il111<•11t n•l:11 i,111, t·ht'll PIW i;Ji,111ld rif•,ht ly L':-:pt~ct tl1;1l this 
rclntion w<iuld lw :1c,·n11nt.c•d [or i11 logiC'al theory. 'l'!tc ;1n.1lysis, 
IHiwc•vt·r, o[ pr(>pu~;il.io11:i:I logic fffc1r·l·l•ds hy t!tc> emrloy111l'llt of nn-
;rn.'.llyzL'd prupnsiti,111,11. v,11·i.1hlcs and the \ISL' of trut!t-ft1t1ctin11,11 
Jl 1·01H1:; it i llll:1 I ( ' lllllll'l' I i Vl'S. Tltt' p1· ,1p11:; i l i ,,,~ i 11 I It i ~~ (0 1 1 11 I , •x L, is 
('1111cL'rtwd wi tit t:hl' ('Xp rcss ion of something tn1c, or r,1lsr>. There 
i.s then, n nt'c-d to clnr ify how tr11tli ,rnd f,1lsi.ty relate to the 
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In the lwdy of tlii.s research, the not i.011 o[ LI tense 111odcl 
of mocl,il logic '.v,1s touched upon. The tense model was [orn1cd hy 
employing logic,11 m,idal systems lit't\.Jeen S!1 ,rnd S5 with differing 
i 11 I: e r p r (' t ,1 r-i O 11 S f ll r h n l h M .1 11 d l. . Tn such :1 modl'l the c0ncept 
of ch.1ngi11g truth v:1luc>s often .1ppe.1rs. The question then is 
1-' It ct It er c Ii: 1 n g i 11 g tr u t It v a 1 u es is i 11 comp at i h le w i th the n .::it u re o f 
,i proposition .incl further whether ch;rnging truth vnl11C'S .ilters 
tl1c "sense" o[ a statement? The possihility of the ;1lteration 
of sense appears excluded at the outset. If the sense, whatever 
this could mean, W3S to change over time, we would be involved in 
,1 regress of intcrp1·,,t,1tion. for if the sense changed, thi.s change 
1-1oul d prc.,;uppose a clwngc in tinw: time, however, is the original 
f;1,·Lor. The <ktL'r111i11,1cv (1[ wh:1t wc ,1rl' to mc;rn by sense', is 
presupposed independently of, ;incl pcrli;1ps logic;1lly prior to tltc 
influence of time. Since we are concerned with the nature of a 
proposition, it becomes obvious th.::it the relations hetween sense 
and Tense should be accounted for in a theory ahout the nature of 
1-!halever we arc to mean then by sense, it must be determinate 
in time. The model which .::illows the values of propositions to change 
in time must ,H·.count [en· the value ass·ir;nment or n proposition at one 
poi11t in time to a~;su111c the st,1tus nf ;rn altl'rn,1Li.ve assignment. Tltc 
direction suggeste'.l tlwn is thnt the sense on the one h.::ind is 
determinate, while the relations of propositions with respect to truth 
v:1 I tll' 111:1\· v;1rv. . . Tlll'Sc.' u•l:1tio11s might, of cnursL', be only suggestive; 
the:,r might he purely fiC'.titious. Changing truth v,ilue does not mean 
tli:1 t some l og·i c·:11 I :11.,r m:1y 111<)VL' fr,>m tlH' realm of neccssJ ty to 
possihility; this would surely be prcposterot1s. What i s at 
st ~1ke here is r~\tlin· the possibility of:\ logil'., for inst;Jncc, 
of countL'rfar.t11:1l cornlit .iorwls. Tn s11ch ;i logic, the value 
assignment is c ont :r,1ry to the factu a l occurr e nce of evc>nts, 
flll':111i ng is ;Jss11mcd to be clctcrminat c , tlion alternative e vents 
should still p1·oduce cetermin.::ite relations. 1 f it is not irra-
tional to c o nsider ,11.tcrnatives in the futun ~, then should we 
expe c t it to lw ixr.--1tio1wl to consider tlwm -i.n the subsequent 
tens e cll: 111g l' S? ill'l" l~ I.JC l1:1vc a t lico1:v th:1t :11 l ows propo s itLnns 
yet given th"is ope1· :1t ·Lon (or cleny this 
l)pc1:at io ,1), th e p1·,1positi.on functions accordin~ to rules in 
tens e logic. A logic of counterfactunls would seem to suggest 
that if the nature of .::i proposition is receptive to such a logi.c, 
tion itself, or .'.lt lc :1st its employment: 
J\ rc:11 prohl(•m or ob_ject:ion at this roint: is perhnrs given 
from l"hL ! 11:1t:t1l"l' nl :1 propo s itillTI. T s t 11 t• p r o po s i t i on 1-' Ii i r h It ;i s 
l'li:rngcd v :iluc! iclent ·il ::il with the llrigin:11 prnpcisition? Tf the 
r n ,posi.L inn i s nut i<k nt ic ;il i.n bn th or curn'1H't•s, then th~ iss11p of 
ch ,1nging truth v:il .ucs would appc;ir tn be exc1uclcd ;it the> 0utsct. 
T!i,• signs, th;1t. i s the 1,onls are ccrt.'.linly thl' snme with the sole 
is 1wl, li,•wL'Vl'r. tltL' p1· (11,o:;it · io11 b11t 011.ly 1-•h;1t is rcprc~ c ntcd. 
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The conditions for identity are perhaps dependent on the form of 
the proposition. The form of the proposition, it seems, re-
solves itself into subject and predicates, etc. Consider the 
case in which there is a chan~e in state of a process, such that 
the process terminotes: n t the time t 1 , p is assigned the 
value T, at t2, pis assigned the value F. A logic to deal with 
such a change would certainly require p, at both t 1 and t 2 , to 
be considered the same proposition. What such a logic must 
account for is in fact the mechanics. The resolution of questions 
of identity actually finds expression in the establishment of 
conditions or rules for the system. This, however, concerns 
rules for the relations which a proposition may enter into. 
What then shall give a unified theory for entailment? On 
the one hand, there are serious problems to resolve from the 
philosophical foundations of logic. On the other hand, certain 
mechanical operations seem to be undeniable. The answer seems 
to center upon methodological considerations. The logical theory 
must be philosophically acceptable and yet be formally rigorous. 
In the process, the nature of a proposition reveals itself by 
showing the various types of relations which it may enter into. 
One i11;ffiediate aim is to clarify the conception of 'sense' as a 
meaningful term about meaning. It might be helpful to speak 
about sentences as opposed to propositions to clarify matters. 
In this way, following the method of Carnap, (see below), one 
can speak of the proposition as the 'sense' or intension of the 
sentence, while leaving value assignment open as the extension. 
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1111;111.- Lyzl' d p1·\11ll1:; iti,1J1:1I v:1ri;1hiL', tl1,· 11:1111rv ,,1· t·li ~· pn,,,p~;itil'Il 
hcgins to show i.tsc•lr. Truth is ,1 key rrn:i.nt ,,f conCL'rn for pro-
TI ll, n1 n c c p t s o f t r u r h , a I t 1t o u g 1t c ] o s c 1 v n 11 i e cl 
of the co11cc11ti.011 o[ tn1Lh ;1llu\,'S tltc sub jec t tll he di.scu:,scd with 
q11;1] ifit- ;1ti,,11. Tlt1•1·l, is for inst:111,·l', 'L 1·11t It' :1!: :111 l'Ilt i tv, i .L'., 
as in the case in which someone migltt i<lentify the Deity with truth. 
On the othl'r 1l,1nd, tl1crc arc morl' restr ict ·c d us:1gL's such ;is truth 
,\ncl furtlwr, t!tcre are 
mcth o <lologic:i.l considcrntions wldcli P,ivc truth ,,s SO!T1Pthini; rlepen(lr.nt 
Su,:h crn1d i lions m:1y give 
ri1},,s cit tn1th, fnr ~;,,rn,, systL'nt:, :rnd m:1y :1ll,11sr f,ll· s11cl1 di:,tinc-
ti,,ns, ,1s I1L'l'.l'Ss:11·y tn1th ,111 tltv h:111d, :111tl f .-1,·t11.1I tn1tlt ,,11 till ' 
other. 
This vi('w is s1q',)'.t'stivc of · sl'V l'r: 11 of till' vit>h'S of l/11dolpil 
C.1r,1 :1p. F1111d;11:1c•11t;1] r,1 l::1rt1:1p's m,•th n d ;1s i;iv,·11 i.11 i'IL•:111i111;_ ,ind 
!'J_l'_ccssitx_,is the> co11L·cption th.::it properties, concc>pts, ,rncl rJUa] i-
t 1,: :: , ct,·., :1rl' r,•:11 :111d i11dl'l'l '1Hl,•11t: 11( 111,•ni-:1! proc0sscs. S(, Further-
applies to rroposit iun, cspec .L.Jlly c on CL'rn i n g :·Ii,, o!i ·jpr tive sr:i.tus 0f 
proposi t Lon~;. This 111,_.LIHHl of scrn;rntic:11 :m:ilysis is dcvc•lnrccl by 
,·,,11::i,IL'l'i111·. 1:11•:111i1l)', ;i,: :;,1111,'l l1i111•. \,1 liicli i); ,·,111~:tn11·t,·d rn,m l'lL•-
llll'III ;iry 1' 1llllj1l'llc'Ill ), . C:1r11;1p's vi,•1s· is n,Hliing l'SJ>1'ci; 1]ly 11,'h', for 
"I 1d ,1 l r (:.-I r 11;111' ~1_, ·. 111 i 11 )'. __ :1_11<1 :~, ·y_,,_.c;~•:_i _L_v' ( Ch i '' :1)',ll: Uni vc•r ~; i ty of 
Cl Ii,· ; 1 , ·., , I' r,, :: ,: , I •1 / I l) . 1, . : · I . 
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1.·/l1:1t C:1ri1.:.1p !1:1:; d,,nr•, l1owcve1·, is to n:pl:1ct• tl1c I r.'.ld i.t ion:J! 
'. 111-
ls unrll,rstnocl ;is ,l funct:.i.on nf rrnnpP11cnt· p:1rts. The c-0mpone11t 
parts tlicm ,wlves :1rL' l.ur,i.c.'.l1 cnnslructiu11s, which a rc :llw lyz cd 
intc'nsio11. 
1 • I 1 . . f · I · · c., 7 1, ,11. C' L lt' llllt':1,;1,,11 ()' ,7 S<'nl'l'lll'C IS( ') (' prop ,1 s1t1nn. T.i ke\,i sc, 
Ji,, r-h~ '1ndJv:lclu,7l' rlrsi~n.,tr,rl 
58 :111 L':-:prcss i.,.>11 h'u11 l cl ht• till' concL>pc. 
ThL' rigor of Cnrnnp's method suggests a direction to a 
pn 'bl cm llll'lll i onl'd c•.irl icr. The 11otiL1n thnt mra 11ing is dcrermin.1tf> 
l' .. ., f; J Vl'll V j L1 h' i11 SO :111 h;1 :, j C'. l') L'llll'll i :-: 
Espvcinllv s t:ro11g is thL · notiun tl!.'.1t 
Wh.i t i.s 
1':1rtic uL1rly st:n 1ng i 11 such c1 v ·iew is tlwt the proposition nssumcs 
!"lie sL:1t11s or ;1 h:1sic· hui.1di11g hlo ck or intel lc1·1:ion. T!Jc motive• 
j S ('() ,'. j VL' ,Ill Ol")'.,111 i ;~('ti 
pt·P))(lS j ( i1lll!,; 
The prnpus i.t :i.c,11 is in :1 
l~nr :i :-;c11tc111·L• must 
rr'-' s1 q,p, ,s ,· th 0 (' "11 text; n f ., l ., 11g1 lil ):;c' sys tc•,11 ,7 ncl y<' t t II L' prnpos i -
t:.i.ll11 is i1hst r:1 c Lccl ;:1·c,rn thl.' sentcnr : l.'. 
60 Tl>id., p . ~'7 . 
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Tile propPsitio11 m;1i11L;1i11:-; ;111 indvpv11dt·11l :,l;1t11 :; ;111<! )'L'L iL 1•11lt•r: -; 
·into ,1 v .1r"i0ty nf lngic.11 rcl:1tions. Tlw SC.'11tL'11Cl.' whi.ch gi.ves the 
Carn.:ip actu :1lly cnlls his me thod rh e met hoc! of 'J.ogi.cill ilnc1lysis' 
in 1.:hich ambiguous vague expressions are mncle more precise ancl 
rigorous. Any rH)t ion thus motlifiL•d is done· so, by 'cxplie.:iti.on.' 
Cnriwp's method, ;is ;1 melhocl .in ll'gLc . , 1..:111lir,1cvs SL'111:111liL·,tl :111;ilysis. 
ThL~ SL'111;111t.:ic,1l 111vtli1>d c;in be contr;1st1•d with 1-.,!l,1L is usu:1lly c.:illed 
( )tl synLH ' ticrl lllt'llHHls wi.11 l, ~acl t:o unn0c e ssary l :imitation on achieve-
ment. "The methods best suited to incr e a s e conc-eptual clarity nre 
(in tllC' 
St'ns e of LhL' tL't·m ·in \,•hLcli it has bcl'n :rppl.iL'd t:o C,rrnap's ,ind Tarsk.L's 
I . ")"()(l St Ill I L'S. lli11t ikk .-1 prncv l' ds in cL1ri ryi111', hy s11ggcst ing, th.:il it 
i.s n1<n·e fruitful t1) inquire into the c trndition s of truth fnr different 
kind s of sc.•nt1211t:cs. This Litter point ·is, ,1ccording to l!intikka, 
rcprcscnl:itive of thl' h ,isic mC!t:hod of semc111tic.:1l analysis. 01 
Tn this rL!SL•nrcli, the systl'rns whi c h employed m:1ter.L.:1l nnd strict 
impli.cntitin, relied nn deducti.vc .rncl ;1:-d,...,m;1til· mL'tlwds which nrc syn-
(,~ 
:-;,.c' l'ri ,n':; trL' :1l m,·11L ,1[ mu lriv:il11vd ll,gh· l'Sf)L't:Lrl]v in 'TlrL' SL'a-
l\;1tLIL' T11murr i1w' :tt")\11nw11t:, T'1·inr, A.N., Form,1l T.og·ic-, 1962, pp. 2!10 
25 0 . 
(,3 .l;1:1kk,> llint ikk .-1, ~l,,d,•ls ftll" ~ltHlnl it il'S, (NL'\..' Y,irk: Tlw l!um.111-ities 
-- - -- --- - -- -· - --
!'rt: ,;,;. l 1.lb '.I) , I'. :• ·1. 
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l>L·c•n q11L'Stio11ah.l,1, i",11· ,1t1r CL)nc crn i11 c,)1 · t;li11 JHiints of the logical 
reL:ition of implic;it l nn. It m.1y be the cn s c thnt the logic.n.1 
structure given in these systems h:is some ;1r.,C'ptnhle npplicntion. 
Tlt L: C.'.111 for :i stn11q•,t'1· SL'llSt' of impl i(';ll inn, i.e., the c:tsc in 
;1vuidcd by Cl'i-t:;iin 111,1d i fic:1tions. Tltl· rt'l L' V:11tct' concept is 
est.:1blishcd bv the not io n of indices in the subscripting technique, 
'and by the incoq)Or;ition of a notion or commona] ity of me.-inlng, 
(s e c con d iti on s g iv t' n i n Ch.1ptcr TV, p.1rt 2). The lntter is pnrti-
cuL:irl y interesting, i11 so f.1r as, it ,tppc.'.11.s to sc>m.intic.il fe.1turc s . 
'I'l l<' ~;c m:1nL j ('~ ; or Ll1,• !;1 l ter COll<' l 'l"!lS t•nt. ;t j] lllt'llt, "cnncc.i Vl'd or ,1S ;1 
1 ·!' I ; t L i 11 11 11 I° l , 1) ', i , · ; t 1 , · , 11 1 : a• q l 1 , • 11< • L' , • • • ~; i 11, · , , i l · It; 1 ~; 1· c 1 d 11 Iv i t It p 11 s s i J, I , • 
( ., 
V,l l" i .-11, J ,,:,. II , .'.. In system I::, 
I\ ➔ )', i S d C p C 11 d L' ll l C111 h O th i1 Sp e C. i f i C 
d e ductive strucuirc ,md the inclusion of ,1 conCL' pt of rclcvilncc. 
The Litter cnnc.cpt :i.s given in terms of the slwrin g of ;i proposi-
tio11,1l vari.;1ble between/\ ,ind IL fin.illy, in so fnr as the v;igue 
1wti1°11 11f "c0! ;1r.1011:ll[tv nf nll':1ninr," 'i.s m:1clc nwrc precise, it h.1s, in 
thl' t·r:1dit i,111 111 C.-1r11.-1p , h c 1'11 L'Xpl i,·.-1t·,,,I. 
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